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ABSTRACT 
When a patent expires, innovator (brand-name) drugs lose their monopoly status and new 
generic competitors are free to enter the market. Theoretically, free market entry and exit 
should lead to a drop in the price of the innovator drug as per the tenets of perfect 
competition. Yet instead of prices decreasing, innovator drug prices are often minimally 
impacted by generic competition and the innovator continues to maintain both market power 
and market share – a phenomenon labelled the generic competitor paradox (Scherer, 1993)  
That the expected supply and demand dynamic is less pronounced in multisource drug 
markets, suggests that non-price considerations influence purchasing behaviour in 
multisource prescription drug markets. This dissertation focuses on the marketing theory of 
brand equity to rationalise the non-price competitive advantages that established 
prescription innovator (brand-name) drugs have over newer bioequivalent generic entrants. 
By analysing the prescribing habits of physicians, we find that brand equity confers a 
competitive advantage to the innovator drug: Brand equity is cultivated during the period of 
patent granted monopoly and creates a first-mover market advantage that is reinforced by 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................... i 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................. ii 
List of Appendices ..................................................................................................................... iii 
BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................... 1 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM ........................................................................................... 1 
JUSTIFICATION .................................................................................................................. 16 
HYPOTHESES AND THEORETICAL RATIONALE .................................................................. 18 
SPECIFIC AIMS AND OBJECTIVES ....................................................................................... 27 
CONCEPTUALISING BRAND EQUITY .................................................................................. 29 
METHODS ................................................................................................................................ 35 
STUDY DESIGN .................................................................................................................. 35 
MEASUREMENT AND INSTRUMENTATION ....................................................................... 42 
DATA MANAGEMENT ........................................................................................................ 54 
DATA ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................. 56 
RESULTS................................................................................................................................... 66 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ................................................................................................... 66 
MARGINAL EFFECTS .......................................................................................................... 71 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS ..................................................................................................... 73 
DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................................. 81 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 86 
APPENDIX ................................................................................................................................ 90 





LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1:  Measurement Matrix ................................................................................................................... 42 
Table 2: Data Analysis Matrix...................................................................................................................... 63 
Table 3: Distribution of Prescription Decisions by Drug ............................................................................. 67 
Table 4: Prescription Choice by Patient Characteristics ............................................................................. 68 
Table 5: Prescription Choice by Physician and Practice Characteristics ..................................................... 70 








LIST OF FIGURES  
 
Figure 1: The Three Domains of Physician-Based Brand Equity ................................................................. 26 
Figure 2: Brand Equity as a Psychological Construct .................................................................................. 33 
Figure 3: Conceptual Summary of Objectives and Hypotheses .................................................................. 34 










LIST OF APPENDICES 















STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
DRUG MONOPOLIES AND THE TRANSITION TO MULTISOURCE DRUG COMPETITION 
Drug patents filed in the United States since 1995 last for 20 years from the date of patent 
application filing (Hunt, 2000). Filing a patent claims proprietorship over the invention of a 
chemical formula found to have some therapeutic utility.  However, receiving a patent is but one 
step in the process that may eventually lead to the commercial marketing of a drug. The 
innovator1 drug must undergo a series of laboratory and clinical trials to determine safety and 
efficacy and be approved by the Food Drug Administration (FDA) before it can appear on the 
market (Statman, 1981). Due to the length and stringency of this drug approval process, nearly 
half the years of patent protection are lost.  By one estimate, the number of years remaining on 
an innovator drug patent after FDA approval - the effective patent life- ranges from 7 to 12 years 
(Grabowski & Vernon, 1996; Grabowski, Long, & Mortimer, 2014). Hence innovating firms must 
face significant sunk costs to apply for approval prior to knowing the competitive landscape of 
the post-patent market (Reiffen & Ward, 2005)  Accordingly, the innovator firm must determine 
if the expected post-entry rents justify the economic and opportunity costs associated with FDA 
application (Reiffen & Ward, 2005).  
Through the lens of public health policy, the drug patent system is intended to strike a 
balance between rewarding innovation and maximising social benefit (Ellison & Ellison, 2011). 
Patents erect a competitive barrier to market entry that permits both market exclusivity and 
 
1 An innovator or brand drug is the first drug created containing its specific active ingredient to receive approval for 
use. It is usually the product for which efficacy, safety and quality have been fully established. When a new drug is 




pricing above marginal cost. This transient monopoly is beneficial to innovating firms wishing to 
recoup the costs of R&D and to maximise profit (Ellison & Ellison, 2011). Yet the opportunity cost 
of rewarding innovation through patent protections is diminished social benefit.  Setting aside 
the influence of third-party payers, the costs associated with drug patent monopolies may limit 
patient choice and thus be detrimental to affordable drug access and social welfare (McAffee, 
Mialon, & Williams, 2004). Subsequently, the rationale posited by policy makers and generic 
entrants alike is that by eventually expiring patents, a vibrant and competitive generic market is 
created that ensures that affordable medications are widely available at prices that reflect the 
marginal costs of production (McAffee et al., 2004).  Social benefit is maximised by the removal 
of the cost barrier to accessing pharmaceutical healthcare options (Boldrin & Levine, 2008; 
McAffee et al., 2004). 
 A generic drug can only be marketed once the innovator drug’s patent has expired. Prior 
to 1984, any firm that wanted to market a post-patent expiration generic undertook a similar 
application process (Hellerstein, 1998). Although a generic competitor did not incur the cost of 
determining which drugs were technically feasible and economically viable, it still faced the 
hurdle of demonstrating efficacy and safety by conducting the same tests required of the 
innovator incumbent (Hellerstein, 1998; Reiffen & Ward, 2005). This lengthy approval process 
constituted a substantial barrier to entry for many generic drugs, as a result of which the generic 
market was relatively undeveloped (Hellerstein, 1994; Hellerstein, 1998).  
The 1984 passage of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 
generally referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Act, reduced the regulatory burden on generic 




generic entrants need only demonstrate bioequivalence2 to the innovator drug already approved 
by the FDA (Reiffen & Ward, 2005).  By streamlining and abbreviating the regulatory process, the 
cost of bringing a generic to market was diminished (Hellerstein, 1994; Hellerstein, 1998; Reiffen 
& Ward, 2005).  
 The Hatch-Waxman act was a legislative compromise that sought to balance incentives 
for innovation against issues of access and affordability (Berndt & Aitken, 2011). Hatch-Waxman 
expedited the approval process for generic prescription drugs, which spurred immediate growth 
in the generic drug industry as many branded innovator drugs went off patent and cost 
containment efforts encouraged consumers to switch to more affordable generic alternatives 
(Grabowski & Vernon, 1996; Hunt, 2000). The generic share of retail prescriptions in the United 
States has grown from 18.6% in 1984 (Berndt & Aitken, 2011) to 89% in 2017(Steven M 
Lieberman, Margaret Darling, & Paul B Ginsburg, 2017).  Conversely, Hatch-Waxman conferred 
certain benefits to patented originator drugs. For example, the policy extended the effective 
patent life of innovator drugs by restoring the patent life “lost” during the clinical testing and FDA 
review period for innovator branded drugs (Hunt, 2000). Ten years after implementing the policy, 
the average effective patent life of new compounds was 11.8 years, 2.3 years longer than the 
9.5-year period applicable to a drug without Waxman-Hatch extensions (Grabowski & Vernon, 
1996; Hunt, 2000). 
 
2 Bioequivalence: the property wherein two drugs with identical active ingredients or two different dosage forms 





STRATEGIC ENTRY DETTERENCE AND THE BEHAVIOUR OF MARKET STAKEHOLDERS 
To both recoup the costs of drug development and profit from a protected monopoly, 
innovating firms are incentivised to extend the life of patents.  A common tactic is to file several 
secondary patents on the same drug to extend the 20-year period and impede market entry of 
generic competitors  (Vokinger, Kesselheim, Avorn, & Sarpatwari, 2017). Another strategy is to 
prolong a drug patent through research on children. Any drug proposed for use in minors is 
automatically granted a 6-month extension (Bhat, 2005). Known as the paediatric exclusivity 
extension, this loophole can only be used twice. Additionally, some innovating firms will 
manufacture modified versions of the originator drug – a strategy known as “evergreening” 
(Collier, 2013).  Slight alterations may be made to the original drug formula. For example, the 
new drug might rework the administration or dosage of the drug resulting in an extended -release 
formula or a rapid release formula (Collier, 2013).Though evergreening will require another 
patent application and clinical trials, it effectively deters the competition from producing a 
generic substitute, unless the FDA determines that the original innovator drug is of the same 
quality as the revised version(Bhat, 2005; Collier, 2013; Vokinger et al., 2017) .  
Beyond patent extension, innovating pharmaceutical firms execute a range of legal 
manoeuvres to both extend their monopoly and deter competitors.  Reverse payment patent 
settlements, also known as "pay-for-delay" agreements involve the innovating pharmaceutical 
firm compensating one or more potential generic challengers to delay their entry into the market 
(Fialkoff, 2013).  These settlements have been criticised as anti- competitive and counter to the 




increase competition and promote access to affordable pharmaceuticals alternatives (Fialkoff, 
2013). In 2013, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Trade Commission could 
sue patent holders for potential anti-trust violations for engaging in these agreements (New York 
Times, 2013). Though reverse-payment settlements are today less ubiquitous, they now often 
involve convoluted arrangements intended to conceal payment (Vokinger et al., 2017).  
In addition to legal recourse, innovator drug manufacturers will engage in other means of 
strategic entry deterrence. One ploy involves an innovating firm implementing restricted 
distribution arrangements to thwart generic developers from acquiring innovator drug samples 
thus hindering potential rivals from completing FDA-mandated bioequivalence testing (Vokinger 
et al., 2017). Innovator brand drug manufacturers also file frivolous petitions with the FDA to 
delay generic drug approvals (Balto, 2018). Typical petitions contend that the FDA’s normal 
bioequivalence comparison method is ineffectual, and that approval of the generic application 
should be deferred pending further testing (Vokinger et al., 2017). Between 2013 and 2015, the 
FDA received 67 such petitions but approved only three (Vokinger et al., 2017).  
THE PIONEER ADVANTAGE OF PATENTS 
 Indubitably, the market power enjoyed by individual innovator drugs derives primarily 
from the intentional grant of patents to allow pricing above marginal cost (Ellison & Ellison, 2011).  
When a patent expires, innovator drugs lose their monopoly status and new generic competitors 
are free to enter the market. Accordingly, the expiration of a pharmaceutical patent, and the 
subsequent opening of a drug market to potential entrants, is a momentous event for both the 




a drop in the price of the innovator drug as per the tenets of perfect competition. Subsequently, 
the conventional wisdom is that the price of a patented pharmaceutical drug will often decline 
significantly once the drug switches to off-patent status due to the entry of generic drugs 
(McAffee et al., 2004). This notion is affirmed by well-publicised scenarios such as when the 
medication Lipitor - the most popular brand of cholesterol-lowering drugs and once the top-
selling branded drug in the world - lost its patent rights in late 2011. This led to a 50% decrease 
of net income for Pfizer Inc. in the fourth fiscal quarter 2011 compared to the same period in 
2010 (Forbes, February 2013; (Chao, Hu, Zhang, & Wu, 2016) ). 
Contrary to the trend of decreasing innovator drug prices with increased competition, is 
the observation that innovator brand-name drug prices are either sustained or increased upon 
generic market entry. Furthermore, innovator pharmaceutical companies continue to maintain 
an unexpected degree of market power– a phenomenon labelled the generic competitor paradox 
(Kanavos, 2008; Regan, 2008). Most innovator brand-name medications maintain large market 
shares upon patent expiration despite intense competition by bioequivalent generics and policies 
favouring generic market entry such as the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 (Lundin, 2000). Regan 
(2008) offers an independent test of the relationship between patent expiration and prescription 
drug prices.   They identify an average $20 differential between innovator and generic 
prescriptions in a multisource drug market. Overall, each generic entrant is associated with an 
average 1% increase in the price of a branded prescription. The price differential between 
innovator and generic substitute grows with entry as the innovator price rises and the generic 




R&D-based drug manufacturers do not attempt to deter generic entry through their pricing 
strategies, which remain above generic substitutes (Kanavos, 2008).  
BRAND EQUITY AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE GENERIC COMPETITOR PARADOX 
On this line of reasoning, the generic competitor paradox may be construed as the 
outcome of non-price considerations in the prescribing (and consequently purchasing) of 
innovator drugs.  This dissertation focuses on the marketing theory of brand equity to rationalise 
the competitive advantage that established brand-name drugs have over newer generic entrants. 
Brand equity is a term used in consumer marketing theory to describe the incremental utility or 
value added to a product by its name (Aaker, 1992; Keller, 1993; Yoo, Donthu, & Lee, 2000). 
Accordingly, brand equity can be estimated by subtracting the utility of physical attributes of the 
product from the total utility of a brand (Yoo & Donthu, 2001). The central premise of this 
dissertation is that brand equity is critically important for physician prescribers to make 
subjective and experiential points of differentiation between innovator drugs and their generic 
alternatives. Notably, these perceived differences in quality between an innovator drug and 
generic substitute exist despite objective bioequivalence evidence to the contrary. We propose 
that in the larger marketplace, entirely subjective experiential and information differences 
between an innovator incumbent and generic entrant signal brand equity.   
Authors like Aaker and Keller have illustrated the process by which brand equity is built 
(Aaker, 1991; Aaker, 1992; Aaker, 1996; Keller, 2001; Keller & Lehmann, 2006) .  Both theories 
have been subject to rigorous psychometric testing in a variety of consumer goods categories, 




that the process of building brand equity within other product categories is applicable to the 
marketing of pharmaceuticals. However, a marked distinction in the dispensing of 
pharmaceuticals is the delegation of decision-making from the patient (principal) to the physician 
prescriber – rendering the latter both gatekeeper and agent. Due to this principal-agent 
arrangement, prescriber practices - in lieu of patient purchasing decisions - are essential to 
investigating the influence of brand equity in the multisource drug market. 
At the outset, it should be reiterated that consumer-based brand equity is a psychological 
construct. Owing to the principal-agent structure of healthcare decisions, the corresponding 
terminology as it pertains to drug selection we have dubbed “physician-based brand equity”. 
Though subjective in nature, the inherent value of building brand equity is nonetheless 
objectively measurable in pricing strategies and revenue streams.  If the tenets of brand equity 
theory are applicable to the pharmaceutical context, a well marketed brand-name drug is more 
easily recognised, memorable, and perceived to be of higher quality than its competitors (Keller, 
1993). Consequently, strong brands represent a set of distinctive characteristics and benefits, the 
net impact of which is the belief on the part of prescribers that the brand or innovator drug is 
superior to generic alternatives (Farjam & Hongyi, 2015).  In accordance with Aaker’s (1991) and 
Keller’s (1993) conceptualisation of brand equity, differences in perceived quality of the 
innovator brand drug versus generic alternatives should develop into a positive attitude towards 
the  branded drug, which in turn fosters a differential response in prescription rates as attitudinal 
loyalty to the brand morphs into behavioural brand loyalty.  
Notably, brand loyalty may itself be a conscious or unconscious driver of prescription 




manufacturer can set the prices of a branded drug with substantial name recognition, over and 
above the prices set by less familiar bioequivalent competitors, and the equilibrium market price 
dictated by perfect competition. Indeed, the value of branding and extensive marketing to a 
pharmaceutical firm, is the ability to create perceived differentiation of a drug despite 
therapeutic equivalency and indistinguishable safety and effectiveness profiles. The ability to 
subjectively differentiate the branded drug from its competitors permits the pharmaceutical firm 
to exercise a degree of control over prices, in a manner characteristic of monopolistic 
competition. The result is increased revenue and increased value – equity – of the branded drug 
(Blackett & Robins, 2001; Pradhan & Misra, 2014). Succinctly stated, cultivating brand equity 
involves product differentiation, which lends itself to pricing flexibility and increased revenues.  
Such a degree of market power would explain the sustained high prices of branded innovator 
drugs despite competition from viable and cheaper generic substitutes (Farjam & Hongyi, 2015; 
Mack, 2007). Therefore, if brand equity theory is equally applicable to the pharmaceutical 
context, any perceived product differentiation resultant of branding efforts lends the innovator 
a competitive advantage over generic entrants (Mack, 2007) such that there is a willingness to 
pay price premiums (Keller 1993), for a drug that is perceived to be a more superior alternative.  
Various psychometric analyses of the relationship between brand loyalty and brand 
equity indicate a bi-directional relationship, with either dimension augmenting the other(Aaker, 
2009; Farjam & Hongyi, 2015; Tuominen, 1999). Cultivated brand equity is self-sustaining – not 
only is it the result of brand loyalty but itself engenders further brand loyalty (Erdem & Swait, 
1998). The marketing literature in other product categories establishes that high brand equity is 




validated second order and third order confirmatory factor analyses as influential contributors 
to brand loyalty (Yoo et al., 2000; Yoo & Donthu, 2001). Brand equity reduces the anticipated 
risk, enhances anticipated confidence in the brand selection decision, and increases satisfaction 
with the brand (Broyles, Schumann, & Leingpibul, 2009).  
As aforementioned, market exclusivity and monopoly status guaranteed by patent 
protections are intended to recoup costs (Mack, 2007). Yet from the perspective of building 
brand equity, an additional hypothesis is that a long period of market exclusivity guarantees the 
innovator brand drug a head start or first-mover advantage with which to build brand loyalty 
and equity to the detriment of ensuing generic competitors (Macit, Taner, Mercanoglu, & 
Mercanoglu, 2016). Cultivating the brand equity of a patented drug creates a momentum in 
demand during the years of market exclusivity that continues upon patent expiration and 
consequent entry of generic competitors(Blackett & Robins, 2001). 
Time plays an important role in our analysis. We hypothesise that time is important in 
innovator brand equity cultivation. Hypothetically, the longer an innovator drug has a monopoly 
on the market, the greater the competitive head start to cycle through the stages of brand equity 
- from initial knowledge about the drug to intransigent brand loyalty or habit persistence.  Habit 
persistence is the tendency of the physician to prescribe the same version of a drug to all patients 
regardless of their individual patient profiles. Conversely, we hypothesise that generic drugs also 
incur a process of time-dependent information infusion and physician learning before achieving 
acceptance among physician prescribers.  If such physicians learn about generic alternatives and 
update their preferences, this would be indicative of switching behaviour. The crux of our 




the balance towards the innovator drug, such as habit persistence, versus which factors 
encourage physician learning and switching behaviour towards generic alternatives.  
To recapitulate, brand equity is both a monetary and qualitative construct. As a financial 
construct, brand equity is represented by the price premium patients are willing to pay for an 
innovator drug over and above that of the bioequivalent generic.  As a qualitative construct, 
brand equity represents a gradation of superlative, yet subjective characteristics possessed by 
the innovator drug versus its generic substitutes. According to Aaker, these psychological 
attributes include greater awareness and knowledge of the innovator drug, positive associations 
with the innovator brand, and perceived quality of the innovator drug (often viewed as superior 
to the bioequivalent generic substitute). The result of this continuum of attitudinal change is 
brand loyalty to the innovator, a psychological attribute that can be quantitatively assessed by 
calculating the likelihood of prescribing the innovator drug over its generic successor. Given these 
monetary and qualitative descriptors,  our analysis incorporates several indicators of brand 
equity: 1)brand equity is quantified by the price premium of an innovator drug ,  which physicians 
are willing to tolerate; 2) brand equity is evidenced by habit persistence and brand loyalty, that 
is, the likelihood of prescribing an innovator drug in a multisource drug market; and  3) Brand 
equity is defined as the perceived consensus quality differential or information differential 
between an innovator drug and generic substitutes. 
THE IMPACT OF AGENCY AND INSURANCE STATUS ON BRAND PREFERENCES 
Due to the asymmetric information problem in healthcare, whereby the physician holds 




for the patient in medical decision making.  Yet the physician is also an agent of the financier of 
health care (including third party payers such as insurance companies and government) and has 
a professional obligation to only provide medically necessary services. In this scenario, we 
assume that both the (indirect) utility of the patient and the insurance expenditures enter the 
utility function of the physician (Crea, Galizzi, Linnosmaa, & Miraldo, 2019).  As a dual agent, the 
physician internalises a share of the patient’s utility in their own utility function, but also a share 
of the drug costs covered by the insurer (Crea et al., 2019). The predicament of perfect physician 
agency is to strike the correct balance between fulfilling the needs and desires of the patient 
while pursuing only those therapies or interventions deemed medically necessary (Nayak, 2013). 
On this line of reasoning, the generic competitor paradox could be construed as a 
principal-agent problem in which physician loyalty to innovator brand drugs results in prescriber 
decisions that differ from the wishes of either the patient or third-party insurance payers 
(Kanavos, 2008; Lundin, 2000).  In keeping with observational evidence, we assume that the 
innovator incumbent is more expensive than the generic substitute. Consequently, a distortion 
of the principal-agent relationship would result in the observed trend of price-inelastic demand 
for innovator brand drugs and residual loyalty to the brand (habit persistence) even upon the 
entry of cheaper bioequivalent generics (Lundin, 2000).  
Conversely, it may be that the demand for innovator brand-name drugs is price elastic 
but this price elasticity in demand is masked by insurance coverage (Lundin, 2000) . While the 
physician is a perfect agent for the patient, neither the principal patient nor the physician agent 




cost by low insurance deductibles. If the physician places a higher weight on the patient’s utility 
than on insurance expenditures, increased insurance coverage leads to a lower probability of 
generic prescribing when the physician values the utility of the patient more than the insurance 
expenditure (Crea et al., 2019). The physician is a perfect agent for the patient but an imperfect 
agent for the insurer.  If patients required to pay large sums out-of-pocket are less likely to have 
innovator brand-name versions prescribed than patients getting most of their costs reimbursed, 
this would be indicative of moral hazard as defined by Pauly 1968: the existence of insurance 
leads patients to overconsume medical care because they do not bear the full marginal cost of 
provision (Lundin, 2000; Nayak, 2013).  
In accordance with Pauly (1968), the use of the term “moral hazard” refers to patients 
who may demand (and receive) too much or too expensive care relative to the social optimum 
because the existence of insurance coverage, as a consequence of which the patient does not 
directly bear the full marginal cost of care (Pauly, 1968) . This characterisation of moral hazard in 
insurance contrasts with the more commonly used definition, which implies that the existence 
of health insurance encourages patients to engage in more risky behaviour (Hellerstein, 1994; 
Hellerstein, 1998) .  While the latter type of moral hazard certainly may exist, Pauly (1968) 
emphasises that even with totally risk averse patients, the existence of insurance may lead to 
overconsumption of healthcare because the marginal cost of treatment is not borne by the 
patient (Arrow, 2004; Pauly, 1968). In the context of the multisource drug market, moral hazard 
in insurance means that despite price advantages neither the insured patient nor physician has 
the incentive to overcome switching costs from the well-established innovator drug to a newer 




prescription drugs and instead receives either too many drugs or overly expensive drugs relative 
to what is socially optimal (Hellerstein, 1994). Despite the suboptimal use of prescription drugs, 
the physician in their prescribing role is a perfect agent for the patient but an imperfect agent to 
the financier of healthcare. 
Insurance coverage is incorporated in our conceptual framework of prescriber brand 
equity as a moderating variable.  We hypothesise that cultivating the brand equity of innovator 
drugs during the drug patent term explains residual brand loyalty or habit persistence in 
subsequent multisource drug markets. We expect that the consequences of brand equity - brand 
loyalty and habit persistence- are further bolstered by insurance coverage that cushions patients 
from incurring the extra cost (price premium) associated with prescribing the innovator drug over 
generic equivalents. Therefore, the removal of third- party payer insulation from costs, 
encourages patient switching behaviour from the innovator to generic drug, which is reflected in 
prescriber practice.  Findings that support the preferential prescribing of innovator drugs to 
patients based on insurance coverage would be evidence of moral hazard. 
CAVEATS REGARDING NOMENCLATURE 
A noteworthy disclaimer regarding diction in this dissertation: The term “generic” is used 
rather loosely in many discussions of prescription pharmaceuticals. It can variously refer to 
versions of a drug sold under the actual generic name, or to drugs not marketed by the original 
innovator firm (Hellerstein, 1994; Hellerstein, 1998).  Moreover, while most of these newer 
bioequivalent entrants are designated generic status, some of these newcomers may be labelled 




(Berger, 2018). To clarify this ambiguity in terminology, first-to-market originator branded drugs 
are henceforth labelled “innovator” with all successive bioequivalent competitors referred to as 
the “generics”.  Therefore, some “generics’” in our analysis include FDA reference listed drugs 
which are bioequivalent but approved and marketed after the originator drug.  Generic 



















PUBLIC HEALTH SIGNIFICANCE 
Conceptualising brand equity from the perspective of the prescribing physician provides 
a rationale as to why health care payers and consumers alike are failing to realise the cost savings 
of a competitive off-patent drug market despite proven bioequivalence of generics, policies 
favouring generic drugs, and pressure from payers towards generic substitution.  
Notably, brand equity is but one aspect of the prescription decision. External influencers 
such as drug availability, the patient’s preference and medical profile, payer preference, 
pharmacy substitution, pharmaceutical marketing efforts and generic drug policy, all impact the 
final prescription decision. However, the central argument put forward in this project is that, 
ceteris paribus, brand equity as perceived by the prescribing physician establishes brand 
preference, which in turn has a strong impact on prescription decisions. Indeed, the afore-
mentioned external factors are but modifiers of prescription behaviours which come into play 
only after notions of drug brand superiority (or lack thereof) are already deeply entrenched.  
 
SIGNIFICANCE FOR PAYERS 
An appreciation of how brand equity drivers and moral hazard impact the prescription 
decision will enable third party payers to better align their policies and incentives to those of the 
physician prescriber, thus lowering formulary costs where pharmacy substitution is over-ridden 





SIGNIFICANCE FOR PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS 
 Notwithstanding the cost of research and development (Ellison & Ellison, 2011), the 
period of market exclusivity granted by a patent remains fixed.  There is therefore a need for 
innovators to recoup costs and maximise their return on investment far beyond patent 
expiration. A crucial means of achieving this end is to sustain brand loyalty beyond patent 
expiration and upon entry of new generic competitors. Cultivating the brand equity of a patented 
drug creates a momentum in demand during the years of market exclusivity that continues upon 
patent expiration and consequent entry of generic competitors (Blackett & Robins, 2001). 
Realising brand value and extending brand equity beyond patent expiration requires a 
systemic and strategic approach in marketing efforts targeting physicians. Understanding the 
brand equity drivers of physician prescription behaviour is the first step in tailoring 
pharmaceutical marketing and branding efforts to achieve greatest impact on the prescribing 














HYPOTHESES AND THEORETICAL RATIONALE 
The overarching assertion of this dissertation is that brand equity is critically important 
for physician prescribers to make points of differentiation between innovator branded drugs 
and their generic alternatives. Accordingly, physician prescribers will - ceteris paribus – 
preferentially prescribe drugs with highest brand equity, which for the reasons subsequently 
cited tend to be innovator branded drugs. 
Of note, there are 3 assertions drawn from Aaker’s and Keller’s customer-based brand 
equity model that inform the ensuing hypotheses. Namely, that an innovator drug with high 
brand equity will: (1) command a price premium over and above that of substitute generics; (2) 
be perceived as qualitatively superior to empirically bioequivalent substitutes; and consequently, 
(3) be prescribed more frequently than these generic alternatives having cultivated its own 
intractable brand loyal prescriber base.  
Subsequently, brand equity is characterised by both a price differential and an 
informational differential between the innovator branded drug and generic alternatives.  
Extrapolating from Aaker’s and Keller’s conceptualisation of brand equity (Aaker, 1991; Aaker, 
1992; Aaker, 1996; Keller, 2001; Keller & Lehmann, 2006) , the assumed directionality of these 
associations is such that innovator drugs with higher perceived quality than their bioequivalent 
generic substitutes, engender a greater sense of brand loyalty from prescribers. This instilled 
brand loyalty to the innovator drug serves to bolster market demand as signalled by a price 




HYPOTHESIS 1  
Longer periods of innovator market exclusivity bestow a first-mover (pioneer) competitive 
advantage to the innovator drug in subsequent multisource markets  
Our central premise is that innovator drugs have a first-mover competitive advantage 
over subsequent generic market entrants. We contend that this first mover advantage is granted 
in part by the monopoly protections of a drug patent and monopoly gains are paradoxically 
evident once patent protections expire and new generics enter the market. We hypothesise that 
innovator incumbents that previously held a longer tenure of market exclusivity (through patent 
extensions or other afore-mentioned means of strategic entry deterrence) will have price and 
brand loyalty advantages in post-patent multisource markets.  
Accordingly, our analytic model measures the impact of monopoly in facilitating the 
creation of innovator brand equity that persists long after the removal of barriers to entry and 
the creation of a multisource drug market.  Our theoretical rationale is that if brand equity is 
indeed an experiential outcome, then innovator drugs with longer periods of market exclusivity 
have a longer duration in which to cultivate this equity which is evidenced by physician loyalty to 
the innovator drug that persists in the subsequent multisource drug market.  
Moreover, because brand equity is by definition “added value” owing to the brand name, 
we expect that patients will be willing to pay a price premium for an innovator drug with positive 
brand equity despite the entry of viable (often cheaper) substitutes. This sustained loyalty to the 
innovator drug can be a strategic barrier for newer generic players to overcome; they too must 
cycle through the process of building their own “brand equity”. Extrapolating Aaker’s theorem, 




perceived quality differential between the innovator and the new generic, the latter must at least 
in part catch up with the brand equity head start that the innovator incumbent already possesses. 
Succinctly stated, our model tests whether generic drugs pitted against innovator incumbents 
with an extended period of market exclusivity face an uphill battle despite favourable pricing. 
Perceptibly, if this hypothesis is confirmed by our model, extending innovator monopoly 
protections (such as through patent term extensions) serves the purpose of strategic entry 
deterrence even when monopoly barriers to entry are themselves removed. 
Certainly, Aaker’s proposed brand equity model (Aaker, 1992; Aaker, 1996)  includes a 
domain for proprietary assets such as patents, which give a firm a temporary monopoly and thus 
create circumstantial loyalty (Aaker, 1991). We hypothesise that this circumstantial loyalty to the 
innovator (imposed by a lack of alternatives), morphs into deeply rooted brand loyalty that 
persists beyond patent expiration (despite the competitive benefits of a multisource drug 
market). Keller provides a theoretical rationale through his pyramidal brand resonance model 
(Keller, 2001), which delineates a psychological process by which intransigent brand loyalty (aptly 
labelled “brand resonance”) is achieved in a series of sequential steps. Perceptibly, the 
implementation of this process requires an investment in time. In context, the longer an 
innovator drug has a monopoly on the market, the lengthier its lead time to build up physician-
based brand equity.  Protracted market exclusivity - granted by either patent protections or other 
barriers to entry for generic substitutes - confers the vanguard innovator crucial time to cultivate 
brand equity and form a loyal customer base. Conversely, later generic entrants must in addition 
to marketing themselves to prescribers (to establish Aaker’s domains of knowledge and 




1991; Aaker, 1992; Aaker, 1996). Inevitably, these ensuing generics must either chip away at the 
innovator drug’s loyalty base and/or create their own loyal customer base, which takes time. 
In contrast, innovator drugs with longer periods of market exclusivity, have a head start 
over generic entrants – extra time during which to cultivate brand equity, and form a loyal 
customer base. Upon patent expiration, built-up brand equity is manifested as product 
differentiation in the face of other highly substitutable alternatives (Aaker, 1996). Due to 
perceived product differentiation, the temporary monopoly created by the patent converts not 
to a perfectly competitive open market, but rather a situation of monopolistic competition in 
which the innovator has the competitive advantage.  This hypothesised first-mover lead would 
be evident in both the innovator’s ability to sustain a price premium, and the prescriber’s 
willingness to continue to preferentially prescribe the innovator despite the competitive 
challenge imposed by cheaper bioequivalent generic substitutes 
For these reasons, we expect that longer periods of innovator market exclusivity will be 
associated with a greater likelihood of innovator prescriptions once the market is open to 
competition from generics. Additionally, we predict that because of cultivated brand equity, 
physicians will be more likely to prescribe innovator drugs regardless of sustained price premiums 







HYPOTHESIS 2  
Physicians will initially overestimate the perceived relative therapeutic benefit between an 
innovator drug and a generic entrant. This consensus quality differential between an innovator 
and its bioequivalent generic will diminish over time as physicians familiarise themselves with 
the generic. 
The estimation models related to our second hypothesis expound on prescriber learning 
and switching behaviour by delineating the process of time-dependent information diffusion and 
generic drug acceptance among physicians.  We compare prescribing behaviour for newer 
generics against that of older generics to determine how physicians’ attitudes towards generics 
differ based on market tenure. Aaker and Keller’s brand equity theories lead us to hypothesise 
that the information differential between innovator and generic will diminish over time. The key 
assumption of this model is that the duration of generic market availability reflects the degree of 
learning and knowledge about the generic, which in turn is a good proxy for the generic’s 
consensus perceived quality. We assert that the information differential between newer versus 
older versions of a drug reflects the consensus quality differential (Howard, 1997).  If indeed 
brand equity is at play in prescription decisions, we expect that physicians will be less likely to 
prescribe newer generics versus the older innovator drug due to an overestimation of the quality 
differential of the innovator drug relative to the newer generic. Over time, physicians familiarise 
themselves with the generic substitute, the information differential lessens, and thus the 
consensus quality differential diminishes to approach that of the true quality differential.  
If indeed innovator drugs have a head start on subsequent generics, it stands to reason 




to build their own “equity”, as physicians familiarise themselves with the drug. Accordingly, the 
likelihood of prescribing the innovator or generic version of a drug could be indicative of 
information diffusion and learning - the gap in prescriber knowledge and familiarity between the 
innovator and generic entrants. As per Aaker’s model – product awareness and perceived quality 
are essential contributors to brand equity(Aaker, 1991). Physicians will more readily switch to 
older generics but remain loyal to the innovator drug (i.e. habit persistence) in the case of newer 
generics. This process of time-dependent information diffusion is borne by the literature 
















Insurance status overrides brand equity preferences 
 A factor that is likely to override physician preferences for innovator drugs is insurance 
coverage. Our third hypothesis tests the influence of external nudges exerted by third party 
payers. The corresponding analytical objective examines the role of insurance coverage in 
qualifying physician brand loyalty.  Our estimated model tests whether habit persistence and 
brand loyalty are altered by insurance coverage. Thus, it is essential to investigate whether 
physicians are more sensitive to costs incurred by individual patients or certain insurance types, 
and less responsive to costs borne by other third-party payers. If physicians in our study sample 
systematically vary prescription decisions based on patient insurance coverage or lack thereof, 
this is evidence of moral hazard - whilst a perfect agent to the patient, the physician is a less 
perfect agent to the financier of healthcare.  As innovator drugs tend to be more expensive than 
ensuing generics, we hypothesise that patients in my reference category of uninsured or self-pay 
patients will be least likely to receive branded innovator drugs, which is evidence of moral hazard 
(Lundin, 2000; Nayak, 2013).  Consistent with the literature, we also expect fewer innovator drug 
prescriptions to be dispensed to patients enrolled in public health insurance schemes such as 
Medicaid and Medicare (Rice, 2011), and cost containment payer systems such as Health 
Maintenance Organisations (HMOs) (Nayak, 2013; Thier, 2011).  
In accordance with the literature, we hypothesise that the innovator drug has a 
competitive advantage granted in part by its first-mover market presence and monopoly patent 
protections. Subsequently, physicians have greater familiarity and experience with the innovator 




over time translated to a perception of superior quality. Thus, when faced with a patient 
encounter featuring third party financing, in which generic-innovator cost differences are 
masked, we theorise that the only criterion under consideration is quality. We hypothesise that 
the trade-off between cost and quality is eliminated. For the reasons given, a prescription 
decision process hinging on quality alone favours the innovator. Hence insurance coverage in this 
scenario alters the physician’s prescription decision by eliminating the cost-quality trade-off. This 
alteration of prescription behaviour because of third-party financing typifies moral hazard. If our 
hypothesis of moral hazard is valid, we expect that patients with insurance will be more likely to 
be issued prescriptions for the innovator drug even if it is only marginally perceived to be of 
higher quality. Conversely, we hypothesise that uninsured (self-pay) patients, will be more 
acutely aware of innovator-generic price differentials and because of this price-sensitivity, will 




























BRAND EQUITY AS A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSTRUCT 
BRAND EQUITY AS A 
FINANCIAL CONSTRUCT 
HYPOTHESIS 1
EXTENDED MONOPOLY --> FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE --> BRAND LOYALTY AND HABIT PERSISTENCE 
HYPOTHESIS 2
LONGER DURATION OF GENERIC AVAILABILITY --> PRESCRIBER LEARNING --> ESTIMATION OF GENERIC 
QUALITY INCREASES --> SWITCHING BEHAVIOUR
HYPOTHESIS 3




SPECIFIC AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
Upon patent expiration, branded innovator drugs face competition from newer generic 
entrants, which should theoretically drive prices down. In this dissertation, we posit that 
innovator drugs with long periods of monopoly and sustained prices above those of competitors 
have achieved brand equity - added value endowed by the brand to the product (Farjam & 
Hongyi, 2015) .  
The overarching goal of this dissertation is to ascertain whether brand equity influences 
prescriber preferences between innovator (brand) drugs and generic alternatives and if third 
party payers can override such preferences. This will be accomplished by the following aims: 
AIM 1: To verify the presence of an innovator first-mover advantage and quantify its impact on 
physician preferences in a multisource drug market 
➔ Are innovator drugs preferentially prescribed over generic drugs in a multisource drug 
market? 
➔ Do the most frequently prescribed innovator drugs retain a significant price premium over 
bioequivalent generics? 
➔ Is there an association between the length of innovator monopoly and ensuing prescriber 
preferences once generics are made available?  
 
AIM 2: To delineate the process of generic drug acceptance (learning and switching behaviour) 
among physician prescribers 
➔ Does increased prescriber experience with new generics counteract the first-mover 




➔ How do market conditions (timing of market entry, price differentials and number of 
generic competitors) influence prescriber switching behaviour away from the innovator 
brand? 
 
AIM 3: To examine the role of insurance coverage in qualifying physician brand loyalty 
➔  How do prescription brand preferences vary based on patient insurance coverage? 

























CONCEPTUALISING BRAND EQUITY 
 
Brand equity in this dissertation is defined as the incremental monetary value accrued by the 
innovator drug due to its brand status in comparison to bioequivalent generic substitutes. The 
prescriber perspective portrayed in this dissertation is an adaptation of consumer-based brand 
equity:  The two most influential conceptualisations of consumer-based brand equity are those 
of Aaker (1991) and Keller (1993). 
Aaker (1991) defines brand equity as “a set of brand assets and liabilities linked to a brand, 
its name and symbol, that add to or subtract from the value provided by a product or service to 
a firm and/or to that firm’s customers” (p.15). Aaker (1991) provides a comprehensive brand 
equity model comprised of five domains: brand loyalty; brand name awareness; perceived brand 
quality; brand associations in addition to perceived quality; and other proprietary brand assets – 
e.g., patents, trademarks, and channel relationships.  
Keller (1993) develops the consumer-based brand equity model (CBBE), which is the most 
widely used model today. Keller defines CBBE by stating that the power of a brand rests on what 
the clients have “learned, felt, seen, and heard about it through time, that is, rests in their minds”. 
Hence, CBBE is “the differential effect of brand knowledge on consumer response to the 
marketing of the brand” (Keller, 1993). Keller’s (1993) definition of CBBE is used in arguing that 
brand equity is positioned based on what consumers feel, see, and hear about the brand through 
time, therefore, the meaning of brand equity rests in the consumers’ minds. Keller’s brand 
resonance model (2011) adds to Aaker’s conceptualisation by introducing a stepwise sequential 




association of the brand in customers' minds with a specific class or customer need; (2) firmly 
establishing the totality of brand meaning in the minds of customers by strategically linking a 
host of tangible and intangible brand associations. (3) Eliciting the proper customer responses in 
terms of brand- related judgment and feelings, and (4) converting brand response to create an 
intense, active loyalty relationship between customers and the brand. 
Our depiction of brand equity as a psychological construct draws upon Aaker’s and Keller’s 
models: Keller’s stepwise brand resonance pyramid is adopted and applied to Aaker’s 
interpretation of brand equity. The first step to building the brand equity of a drug is brand 
awareness or salience. Brand salience relates to how often and easily the brand is evoked in the 
mind of the prescriber – it includes brand-name recognition and recall. Steinman et al concluded 
that a characteristic as elementary as the length of the drug name in comparison to competitors, 
can influence prescriber decisions towards the drug with shorter appellation, as longer names 
are less easy to recall (Steinman, Chren, & Landefeld, 2007). Conjointly, brand salience and brand 
awareness establish brand identity in the mind of the physician prescriber (Aaker, 1991; Aaker, 
2009; Keller, 1993; Keller & Lehmann, 2006). 
The second step in building brand equity of an innovator drug is instilling positive brand 
associations within the mind of the prescriber (Aaker, 1991); The equivalent of brand associations 
in Keller’ s model is brand performance and brand imagery.  Brand performance relates to how 
the drug meets physician's functional objectives regarding treatment.  Brand imagery deals with 
the extrinsic properties of the drug, including abstract associations(Keller, 2001). Together brand 




The penultimate step towards establishing brand equity is to influence the physician’s brand 
response to the brand-name by influencing attitudinal aspects of perceived quality (Aaker, 1991) 
. This response according to Keller’s brand resonance model includes formation of brand 
judgements and brand feelings towards the drug brand in question. Brand judgments focus on 
the physician's own personal opinions and evaluations. Brand feelings are the physicians' 
(subconscious) emotional responses and reactions with respect to the brand. 
The final step in the brand equity continuum is establishing brand loyalty (Aaker, 1991)  or 
brand resonance (Keller, 1993; Keller, 2001). Brand resonance refers to the nature of the 
relationship that customers have with the brand and the extent to which customers feel that they 
are "in sync" with the brand. Resonance is characterised in terms of the intensity or depth of the 
psychological bond customers have with the brand, as well as the level of activity engendered by 
this loyalty (Keller, 2001; Pradhan & Misra, 2014). 
At this juncture, we reiterate our contextual definition of brand equity: the value premium 
that an innovator drug with a recognisable name generates when compared to its bioequivalent 
generic. Drawing from Aaker and Keller’s conceptualisation of brand equity, this added value is 
determined by consumer perceptions and experiences with the brand.  Due to the principal-
agent relationship within the healthcare context, we assert that the key decision-maker or 
“consumer” subject to brand equity influence is the physician agent. Referencing our conceptual 
model, brand equity is an experiential outcome: It develops and grows because of a physician’s 
experiences with the innovator brand drug. The brand equity process typically involves a 
progression of interaction with the innovator brand drug that unfolds following a predictable 




associations → Brand Loyalty. Brand equity is attained when an innovator drug is well recognised 
and easily recalled by prescribers, subjectively perceived to be of superior quality to 
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This dissertation relies on secondary data from the 2015 and 2016 National Ambulatory 
Medical Care Survey (NAMCS), which is a cross-sectional national survey of non-federally 
employed office-based physicians who are primarily engaged in direct patient care(National 
Center for Health Statistics, 2019b).   
The data set is uniquely suited to assessing physician demand for innovator (“brand”) 
drugs because one can decipher which version of the drug – innovator or generic successor – was 
initially prescribed by the physician hence surmise physician preferences. In contrast, drug 
mentions on most other secondary data sources- such as insurance claims datasets-are of drugs 
ultimately dispensed to the patient, which might instead reflect pharmacist substitution and/ or 
drug formulary restrictions imposed by the payer. As our interest is primarily in physician 
prescription behaviour, the focus is on the physician’s choice of medication, as initially entered, 
regardless of the version of the drug eventually dispensed. 
DESCRIPTION OF DATA SET 
Sampling Strategy 
The National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS) is a nationally representative 
survey of non-federally employed office-based physicians who are primarily engaged in direct 
patient care.  The annual survey randomly selects a group of office-based physicians to record 
information on approximately 30 patient visits for a randomly assigned 1-week reporting period.  
The basic sampling unit for the NAMCS is the physician-patient encounter or visit. The survey is 
purposed to address the need for empirical information about the provision and use of 




settings are recruited to complete data forms for a representative sample of patient visits.  
Sampling is conducted using a multi-stage stratified probability approach and visit weights and 
clustering variables are available to convert survey data to nationally representative estimates 
(CDC/National Center for Health Statistics, 2019).  
The NAMCS utilises a multistage probability design that involves probability samples of 
primary sampling units (PSUs), physician practices within PSUs, and patient visits within practices. 
The first-stage sample includes 112 PSUs (CDC/National Center for Health Statistics, 2019). PSUs 
are geographic segments composed of counties, groups of counties, county equivalents. Using 
these geographical groupings, a probability sample of practising physicians is selected from the 
master files maintained by the American Medical Association and the American Osteopathic 
Association. Within each sampling unit, all eligible physicians were stratified by specialty 
(CDC/National Center for Health Statistics, 2019) . Physicians were then assigned to 52 random 
subsamples of approximately equal size – corresponding to 1 of the 52 weeks of the survey year.  
Finally, a systematic random sample of visits is selected by the physician during the reporting 
week. The sampling rate varies for this final step from a 100 percent sample for very small 
practices, to a 20 percent sample for very large practices as determined in a presurvey interview 
(CDC/National Center for Health Statistics, 2019; National Center for Health Statistics, 2019)  
Data Collection 
Notably, prescription data collection directly from the physician, rather than from the 
patient, pharmacy or payer; dovetails well with the overall analytical objective -  to evaluate the 




payer mandates, and drug formulary restrictions, all of which may alter which version of the drug 
the patient receives ((Steinman et al., 2007)  
The U.S Census Bureau acts as the data collection agent. Each physician is randomly 
assigned to a 1-week reporting period. During this week, physicians or medical office personnel 
are instructed to keep a daily record of all patient visits. Often, the maintenance of this log falls 
instead to Census field representatives. For example, more than half of the NAMCS Patient 
Record forms submitted in 2009 (51.5 percent) were abstracted by Census Bureau staff rather 
than by the physician or medical office personnel (CDC/National Center for Health Statistics, 
2019). During this 1-week reporting period, data for a systematic random sample of visits are 
recorded using an automated Patient Record form developed for this purpose. Visits were 
selected from the list using a random start and a predetermined sampling interval based on the 
physician’s estimated visits for the week and the number of days the physician was expected to 
see patients that week. In this way, a systematic random sample of visits was obtained. The 
sampling procedures were designed so that about 30 Patient Record forms were completed 
during the assigned reporting week. This minimised the data collection workload and maintained 
about equal reporting levels among sample physicians regardless of practice size (CDC/National 
Center for Health Statistics, 2019; National Center for Health Statistics, 2019a). 
Data are obtained on patient characteristics such as age, sex, race, and ethnicity, and visit 
characteristics such as patient’s reason for visit, physician’s diagnosis, services ordered or 
provided, and treatments, including medication therapy(CDC/National Center for Health 




and his or her practice characteristics are collected as part of a survey induction interview. The 
data set also includes expected sources of payment for a visit including private insurance, public 
insurance and self-pay options, which allows us to assess for the influence of a third-party payer 
on the prescription decision and the existence of possible moral hazard among prescribers 
(CDC/National Center for Health Statistics, 2019; Hellerstein, 1998; Howard, 1997) . 
Scope and Limitations 
The basic sampling unit for the NAMCS is the physician-patient encounter or visit. Only visits 
to the offices of non-federally employed physicians classified by the American Medical 
Association or the American Osteopathic Association as "office-based, patient care" are included 
in the physician universe. Physicians in the specialties of anaesthesiology, pathology, and 
radiology are excluded. Types of contacts not included are those made by telephone, those made 
outside the physician’s office (for example, house calls), visits made in hospital settings (unless 
the physician has a private office in a hospital and that office meets the NAMCS definition of 
"office"), visits made in institutional settings by patients for whom the institution has primary 
responsibility over time (e.g., nursing homes), and visits to doctors’ offices that are made for 
administrative purposes only (e.g., to leave a specimen, pay a bill, or pick up insurance forms) 
(CDC/National Center for Health Statistics, 2019; National Center for Health Statistics, 2019; 
Nayak, 2013). 
Of note, the NAMCS has practice characteristics, physician characteristics, patient 
characteristics, but does not have information about interactions with pharmaceutical sales 
representatives or other forms of industry influence which might influence the prescription 




It is also important to reiterate that medications ordered are not necessarily the medications 
ultimately dispensed to the patient by the pharmacist.  Barring physician injunction, the 
pharmacist has leeway to substitute an innovator for a generic or vice versa. Hence one cannot 
ascertain based on NAMCS disclosures which drug was ultimately dispensed to the patient 
(Hellerstein, 1998). Nevertheless, as our research question focuses on the physician order rather 
than the execution of it, any such discrepancies do not impact our conclusions. 
DRUG SELECTION  
This dissertation examines physician prescribing habits for the top multisource drugs 
reported in the NAMCS database.  We narrow our focus to the top 6 most prescribed multisource 
drugs. Drugs in the database are assigned characteristics during data processing, based on the 
Lexicon Plus®, a proprietary database of all prescription drugs products available in the United 
States drug market (CDC/National Center for Health Statistics, 2019). Of note, NAMCS drug 
variables are coded twice: first "as entered" by the physician on the survey data collection form, 
using an NCHS-assigned 5-digit code, and second using a corresponding 6-digit generic-
equivalent code based on the Multum classification (National Center for Health Statistics, 2019) 
. The Multum code for a given drug reflects up to 6 of its components. Therapeutic class (drug 
category) is also assigned using Multum; up to 4 therapeutic classes can be assigned per drug in 
NAMCS. Additionally, the NAMCS data set lists up to thirty drugs prescribed by the physician for 
each patient encounter.   To increase study power, all drug mentions are included in this analysis 
and matched with the appropriate coded chemical entity.  However, to avoid biasing the analysis 
to physician specialties that prescribe/record many drugs, we calculate drug frequency (to 




To achieve our stated objectives and avoid confounding, it is necessary to supplement the 
data set with drug-specific characteristics garnered from the publicly available FDA Electronic 
Orange book (https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/ ). This resource details drug 
idiosyncrasies such as narrow therapeutic indices, approved generic competitors, and drug 
approval dates (if after January 1, 1982). The Orange Book also discloses therapeutic equivalency 
concerns about generic successors, which is an important consideration impacting the likelihood 
of substitution.  
OTHER INCLUSION/EXLUSION CRITERIA 
We will impose inclusion and exclusion criteria to the NAMCS data set to meet the stated 
objectives regarding the physician prescription decision.   At the outset, all records in which the 
patient was seen by a non-physician provider or physician extender such as a nurse practitioner 
or physician assistant, are dropped.    
To reiterate, the analysis is limited to “multi-source” drugs (primary inclusion criterion). 
By implication all “single source” drugs, that is, innovators without a generic equivalent on the 
market (or vice versa) will be dropped from the analysis.  Among the remaining multisource 
drugs, supplementary information regarding drug-specific characteristics and pricing information 
from the FDA Electronic Orange Book and Micromedex IBM Red Book respectively, is sought out 
for the identified multisource drugs. 
Moreover, as there is a tendency to code biologics and supplements by the generic name 
of the product (e.g. “Hepatitis Vaccine,” “Vitamin B", “Iron Supplements"), without consideration 




are excluded from the analysis (Nayak, 2013). Also excluded from the analysis are drugs for which 
a match could not be found with Multum Lexicon (a, c, or n codes). 
Physician visits for which a drug was not prescribed are also excluded from the sample as 
a prescription decision was not involved. Similarly, physician visits for which there is insufficient 
payment information are dropped from the analysis, as these records may skew our assessment 








MEASUREMENT AND INSTRUMENTATION 
Table 1:  Measurement Matrix 
MEASURED 
VARIABALE  
DATA SOURCE DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLE  TRANSLATION PROCEDURES / 
CONSTRUCTON OF VARIABLE 
RATIONALE 
AIM1: To verify the presence of an innovator first-mover advantage and quantify its impact on physician preferences in a multisource drug market 





NAMCS data set Binary outcome measure of 
the decision to prescribe an 
innovator drug or its generic 
alternative 
Binary outcome measure 
1= Innovator Prescribed 
0= Generic prescribed 
 
 
This variable directly measures prescriber 
choice and thus is a proxy measure for 
prescriber preference and brand loyalty. 
In this model, preferential prescriptions for 
the innovator drug imply a first-mover 
advantage. 
PRIMARY PREDICTORS OF FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE  
Innovator 







The period during which the 
innovator drug has no 
competitors i.e. has a 
monopoly on the market. 
 
Measures the impact of 
innovator market exclusivity 
(including patent 
protections) on prescriber 
preferences in the 
subsequent multi-source 
drug market. 
Time elapsed (in years) between 
FDA approval of innovator drug to 
FDA patent approval of first 
generic competitor. 
 
 We hypothesise that initial market 
exclusivity is the main contributor to the 
first-mover advantage of innovator drugs. 
This variable confirms our hypotheses as to 
whether the length of innovator monopoly 
confers it a pioneering advantage by way of 






DATA SOURCE DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLE  TRANSLATION PROCEDURES / 








Price differential between 
the innovator drug and the 
generic substitute. 
 
Proxy measure for brand 
equity (value premium of 
innovator drug generated by 
physician and patient 
perception of superiority). 
 
 
Unit = Average Wholesale Price 
(AWP) 
 
Natural log of the ratio of the 
AWP of the innovator to the 
median AWP of generic 
substitutes. 
 
The ratio of prices is used in lieu 
of the arithmetic difference in 
price between both versions of a 
drug because innovator/ generic 
price differences vary 
considerably based on dosage and 
product-form but the ratio of 
generic price to innovator price is 
largely unaffected by these 
superficial characteristics. The 
ratio of prices is transformed into 
a natural logarithm so that 
equivalent percentage differences 




The price premium is a tacit measure of the 
strength of a brand and thus a proxy for 
brand equity, which results in a first mover 
advantage(Aaker, 1996) . We assume that 
an innovator brand with high brand equity 
will be priced higher than empirically 
substitutable generics.  
 
By expressing the price difference as a ratio, 
we assume that physicians are aware of the 
relative price differences between brand 
drugs and generic drugs (if not necessarily 







DATA SOURCE DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLE  TRANSLATION PROCEDURES / 
CONSTRUCTON OF VARIABLE 
RATIONALE 
AIM 2: To delineate the process of generic drug acceptance among physicians 





NAMCS data set Binary outcome measure of 
the decision to prescribe an 
innovator drug or its generic 
alternative 
Binary outcome measure 
1= Innovator prescribed 





















This variable directly measures prescriber 
choice and thus is a proxy measure for 
prescriber preference and brand loyalty. 
 
In the context of generic drug acceptance, 
the likelihood of prescribing the innovator 
drug is hypothesised to diminish as 
information and awareness about successive 
generic substitutes diffuses through the 
marketplace of physician agents. Prescriber 
choice in this model, reflects the degree of 
awareness and acceptance of generic 






DATA SOURCE DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLE  TRANSLATION PROCEDURES / 
CONSTRUCTON OF VARIABLE 
RATIONALE 






differential between an 
innovator drug and generic 
substitute. This is also a 
measure of the consensus 
quality differential between 
innovator and generic. 
 
The ratio of the duration of 
generic market availability 
relative to duration of 
innovator market 
availability is the proxy for 
the information differential. 
 
Represents the degree of 
information diffusion of a 
generic relative to the 
innovator incumbent. 
Units: Time elapsed (in years) 
between FDA approval of brand or 
generic drug to January 1, 2015. 
 
Generics approved prior to 1982 
(i.e. prior to FDA data collection 
period in orange book) are 
assigned a ratio of 1.  
 
The generic availability ratio is 
measured in logarithmic terms to 
render equal percentage 
differences in the ratio equivalent 
for purposes of the estimation. 
 
The information differential measures degree 
of awareness and learning about a generic.  
The information differential also represents 
the perceived quality estimation of the 
generic relative to the innovator. As 
physicians know more about a generic their 
estimation of the generic’s quality increases 
to approach that of the brand. 
 
In keeping with our hypotheses and preceding 
literature (Howard, 1997), we expect that 
physicians will initially overestimate the 
quality differential between the innovator and 
the new generic substitute. As physicians have 
no experience with the generic, its true quality 
is unknown – there is a large information 
differential between the innovator and a new 
generic. As time passes, physicians become 
familiar with therapeutic attributes of the 
generic substitute. The information 
differential between generic and innovator 
diminishes. Concurrently, physicians revise 
their estimation of the generic’s quality to 
approach that of the true quality differential 
(Howard, 1997). 
Log of   Years of generic drug availability 






DATA SOURCE DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLE  TRANSLATION PROCEDURES / 





The Red Book 
(Truven Health 
Analytics) 
Price differential between 




Unit = Average Wholesale Price 
(AWP) 
 
Natural log of the ratio of the 
AWP of the innovator to the 
median AWP of generic 
substitutes. 
The price premium is a tacit measure of the 
strength of a brand and thus is a proxy for 
brand equity(Aaker, 1996). 
 
In context, the price premium quantifies the 
impact of generic drug acceptance, such 
that innovator predecessors of well-known 
and widely accepted generic drugs, are 
hypothesised to have a lower or non-
significant price premium as the perceived 
information differential between both 
versions of the drug diminish. By reviewing 
the correlation between the price premium 
and the information differential we can 
ascertain whether the gap between the 
price of a generic drug and its innovator 
counterpart grows smaller as the perceived 
relative therapeutic benefit associated with 












DATA SOURCE DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLE  TRANSLATION PROCEDURES / 
CONSTRUCTON OF VARIABLE 
RATIONALE 
AIM 3: To examine the role of moral hazard in qualifying physician brand loyalty 





NAMCS data set Binary outcome measure of 
the decision to prescribe an 
innovator drug or its generic 
alternative 
Binary outcome measure 
1= Innovator Preference 
0= Generic preference 
 
 
Measure of brand loyalty and prescriber 
preference.  
PRIMARY PREDICTORS OF MORAL HAZARD AND HABIT PERSISTENCE (X) 
Insurance Type NAMCS data set Type of Insurance coverage 5 dummy categories: HMO/other 
prepaid 
plan, Medicaid, Medicare, private 
/commercial insurance, and self-
pay 
 
Reference category is self-pay 
 
 
If physicians exhibit moral hazard, we expect 
that prescriptions of the innovator drug will 
vary across insurance categories (Lundin, 
2000; Nayak, 2013). If one or more of the 
dummy insurance coefficients is significant it 
may be construed as evidence of moral hazard 
- physicians have a different likelihood of 
prescribing generics to the reference category 
of self-pay/uninsured patients than to patients 
holding certain types of insurance. 
 
However, if all categories of health insurance 
exhibit no differential prescribing (no 
significant coefficients) this supports the 
notion of habit persistence i.e. physicians 
prescribe the same drug to all patients 






DATA SOURCE DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLE  TRANSLATION PROCEDURES / 







Ratio of average innovator 
drug price to average 
generic drug price in 2015 
Unit = Average Wholesale Price 
 
Natural log of the ratio of the 




The price differential is included as an 
independent variable to pre-empt omitted 
variable bias: The difference in price 
between an innovator drug and its generic 
successor is correlated with both the 
patient’s or third party’s willingness to pay 
for the drug and the physician’s willingness 
to prescribe the drug.  
 
Significant coefficients would suggest that 
physicians are in part conscious of the price 
differential between an innovator drug and 
its generic substitutes. 








NAMCS data set 
Interactive variable of Price 
and Insurance 
 
Describes how the price 
difference between the 
innovator and its generic 
substitutes influences the 
physician prescription 
decision for patients with 
different insurance coverage 
Interaction variable Impact of innovator price premium on 
prescriber preference for patients with 
different insurance coverage. If any of these 
variables is significant, the implication is that 
physicians consider the innovator price 
premium when prescribing the innovator 
drug to patients with different insurance 










DATA SOURCE DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLE  TRANSLATION PROCEDURES / 











The period during which the 
innovator drug has no 
competitors i.e. has a 
monopoly on the market. 
 
Measures the impact of 
innovator market exclusivity 
(including patent protections) 
on prescriber preferences in 




Time elapsed (in years) between FDA 
approval of innovator drug to FDA 
patent approval of first generic 
competitor. 
 
 We hypothesise that initial market exclusivity is 
the main contributor to the first-mover 
advantage of innovator drugs. This variable 
confirms our hypotheses as to whether the 
length of innovator monopoly confers it a 
pioneering advantage by way of pricing or 
physician preference.  




The duration generics have 
been available  
 
Duration of multisource market 
competition 
Time elapsed (in years) between FDA 
approval of first generic drug to 
January 1, 2015 
Explicitly this variable measures the effect of 
generic competition on the innovator’s brand 
equity and physician prescription preferences.  
Included in this first model to avoid overstating 
the impact of innovator monopoly on prescriber 
preferences thus avoiding omitted variable bias). 
Implicitly, this variable also indicates whether 
older generics ever catch up to their innovator 
counterparts’ pioneering advantage as 
determined by both a smaller price differential 







DATA SOURCE DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLE  TRANSLATION PROCEDURES / 
CONSTRUCTON OF VARIABLE 
RATIONALE 
COVARIATES FOR AIMS 1-3 
Physician 
Characteristics –  
NAMCS data set Includes physician 
characteristics available in 
data set – specialty, and 
demographics 
Vector of dummy variables This vector controls for heterogenous physician 
characteristics.  
 
We expect that specialty physicians will be more 
likely to have similar prescription habits with 
high concordance within the group as to which 
drug classes are prescribed in the generic form 
and which drug classes are prescribed as brand-
name only. The drug case-mix will therefore 







NAMCS data set Includes:  
Region; Practice type; 
Practice Ownership; Patient 
record system; Electronic 
prescriptions; Drug 
formulary checks 
Vector of dummy variables This vector controls for heterogenous practice 
characteristics. Moreover, If the physician is a perfect 
agent for the patient, then physician characteristics 
should have no impact on the prescription decision. 
 
Health economists have proposed that physician 
practice follows a “Bayesian learning process”, 
whereby physicians update their behaviour by 
observing the behaviour of peers and adapts to the 
“local style of practice” (Frank & Zeckhauser, 2007; 
Phelps & Mooney, 1993). We expect to observe 
similar prescribing habits among physicians in similar 
practice types and regions. We also expect changes in 
prescribing practices based on physician ownership – 
Rice (2011) found that prescribing habits differ for 
those in HMO owned practices.  Moreover, the 
implementation of electronic health records and 
prescribing platforms is likely to modify behavioural 
switching costs and, in the case of drug formularies, 







DATA SOURCE DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLE  TRANSLATION PROCEDURES / 




NAMCS data set A vector of patient 
characteristics including their 
age and race 
Vector of dummy variables This covariate measure controls for 
heterogenous patient characteristics 
Drug Specific 
Idiosyncrasies 
NAMCS data set Controls for whether drug is 
combination therapy; 
controlled substance; 
narrow therapeutic index; 
continued or new 
medication 
Vector of dummy variables Whether an innovator drug is considered as 
part of a narrow therapeutic index will 
increase perceived risk such that physicians 
are less willing to substitute with a generic 
(Nayak, 2013) 
 
Because of behavioural switching costs and 
inertia, I anticipate that those continuing an 
already existent prescription of a branded 




Drug Controls NAMCS data set 5 individual drug dummy 
variables to flag 
prescriptions for the most 
frequently prescribed 
multisource drugs within the 
database  
Vector of dummy variables Included dummies for the top individual 
multisource drugs and top therapeutic drug 
classes to control for the influence of 
unobservable drug characteristics other 





ASSESSMENT OF MEASURES – RELIABILITY, VALIDITY AND GENERALISABILITY 
Price Differentials 
By explicitly incorporating price differentials as covariates in our analysis we can 
determine whether physicians weigh drug costs against perceived therapeutic benefit when 
prescribing a multisource drug.  If indeed brand equity theory plays a significant role in 
multisource drug markets, we expect that the price premium of the brand will reflect the 
perceived superiority of the brand. We therefore predict that the gap between the price of a 
generic drug and its innovator counterpart reflects the differences in perceived relative 
therapeutic benefit.  
Furthermore, the inclusion of price differentials in the third model facilitates an 
assessment of moral hazard including the possibility of subtler interactive effects between an 
innovator’s price premium and insurance type. For example, it is conceivable that physicians are 
indeed creatures of habit prescribing innovator or generic versions of a drug to all patients 
(Hellerstein, 1998)  except in cases where the price premium of the innovator alternative exceeds 
a certain expense threshold at which point, patients who face high out-of-pocket costs (such as 
those classified self-pay or uninsured) are less likely to receive a significantly more expensive 
innovator drug if cheaper generic substitutes are available. 
Admittedly, drug prices are both opaque and constantly mutable, which impacts both the 
reliability and validity of pricing data. As previously stated, we utilise average wholesale prices 
(AWPs) culled from the Red Book to determine price differentials. According to the Red Book, 
published by IBM Micromedex, the pricing information is "based on data obtained from 
manufacturers, distributors, and other suppliers." However, despite the data source, published 




prescription drugs. Nonetheless, we believe our findings about drug pricing to be valid, reliable, 
and generalisable because our interest lies in the relative difference in drug pricing. Presumably, 
physicians are themselves not privy to precise drug pricing information, and instead are more 
likely to be cognisant of the relative price differences between innovator and generic drugs and 
if price-sensitive will vary their prescribing behaviour based on this relative assessment of 
expense, which is captured with enough accuracy by the price premium variable.  
The Information Differential 
The Information differential variable introduces the concept of information diffusion into 
the second estimation equation. The intention of this variable is to capture how accurately a 
physician can gauge the quality difference between innovator and generic substitute. Our 
conceptualisation of this variable (The ratio of the duration of generic market availability relative 
to duration of innovator market availability) accounts for the notion that a physician’s awareness 
and knowledge about a given drug increases over time. Accordingly, the physician’s assessment 
of quality differences between an innovator and its generic substitutes increases in accuracy the 
longer the generic has been on the market.  These arguments regarding consensus awareness, 
knowledge, and perceived quality over time, echo both Aaker’s and Keller’s models of brand 
equity. Yet despite theoretical grounding, the true market consensus quality differential remains 









HUMAN SUBJECTS CONSIDERATION 
 This project relies primarily on publicly available secondary data from the National Centre 
of Health Statistics, which has been anonymised to circumvent potential ethical concerns 
including physician privacy protection and patient confidentiality. Though unlikely, any incidental 
patient information disclosures are discarded in keeping with The Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (HIPPA) guidelines. Supplementary drug pricing information sourced from 
the Redbook (IBM Micromedex) is considered proprietary. Accordingly, the relevant precautions 
have been taken in keeping with the organisation’s terms and conditions and the protocol 
specified by the Office of Institutional Compliance at UTHealth. The use of a password is required 
to access any proprietary data, which is stored and maintained in a manner consistent with 
UTHealth research guidelines. Only academic advisors directly related to the project, supervisory 
project/dissertation committee, and the study investigator have access to this portion of data.  
All study protocols will undergo scientific review by the relevant University of Texas 
project/dissertation review committees, and approval by the UTHealth Institutional Review 
Board.  
DATA INTEGRITY – MISSING DATA 
NAMCS has a defined protocol for handling missing data. As per the microdata file for the 
2015 survey, some survey items such as vital signs (e.g. height and weight) are presented with 
calculated non-response rates. Other missing data items are imputed by randomly assigning a 
value from a patient record form with similar characteristics, where similar visits are generally 
those of the same specialty, geographic region or diagnostic group.  Other data items such as 




sequential regression imputation method (NAMCS microdata file, 2015 and 2016). Following a 
convention implemented in 2007, missing data in the 2015 and 2016 dataset have consistent 
negative codes indicating blank, unknown or inapplicable data. These coding conventions are 




















KEY A PRIORI ASSUMPTIONS IN THE MODEL DESIGN 
In our analysis, we assume that the physician is a perfect agent for the patient. However, the 
role of physician agency with respect to third-party financiers of healthcare is less clear, and thus 
a subject for examination in our analysis.  
In choosing between an innovator and its generic successor, the patient’s preferences for 
either version of the drug is based solely on a trade-off between quality and cost. Notably, the 
assessment of quality is subjective and person-specific hence the designation of “perceived 
quality. It should also be explicitly stated that the entire rationale behind the analytical model is 
built on the well-established premise that, in general, innovator drugs tend to be more expensive 
than their generic successors. As such, the physician (as a perfect agent of the patient) will choose 
the costlier innovator drug over less expensive generics only if the innovator drug is perceived to 
have a higher quality value.  
Our analysis tests if this quality and cost trade-off can be over-ridden by the presence of a 
third-party payer, that is if insurance status alters the decision outcome. Particularly, we test the 
hypothesis that insurance coverage (which presumably reduces out-of-pocket payments by the 
patient) masks the true cost differences between the costlier innovator and the less expensive 
generic successor thus altering the prescription decision (moral hazard). Notably this 
investigation of moral hazard assumes that the physician is cognisant of the patient’s payer status 
and price sensitivity, and as a perfect agent reflects these preferences in their prescription 
decision. The analytical model also assumes that the physician is aware of the relative magnitude 




unclear about exact price points. A qualitative judgement that an innovator drug is more, less, or 
comparably expensive than its generic equivalent, should suffice. If indeed insurance coverage 
masks the true innovator-generic cost differential, then the only criterion under consideration is 
quality. As neither patient nor physician perceive a cost difference between an innovator and its 
generic, the physician will prescribe the version of a drug considered to be of higher quality. 
While physicians may be somewhat cognisant of the relative cost differences between an 
innovator and its generic equivalents, a priori, the physician agent is somewhat less certain about 
the quality of the generic relative to its innovator predecessor. This assumption underscores our 
second hypothesis that physicians will initially overestimate the perceived relative therapeutic 
benefit between an innovator drug and a generic entrant. This information differential between 
an innovator and its bioequivalent generic will diminish over time as physicians familiarise 
themselves with the generic.  
The rationale here is that there is a cost to ascertain the quality of a generic - time invested 
in experience and research, that is, a switching cost associated with prescribing a generic. While 
the price of the drug is borne by the insurer and patient, the switching cost is incurred by the 
physician prescriber. Therefore, this switching cost must be tagged onto the retail price to assess 
the total cost incurred by both patient and physician i.e. Total Cost of Generic = Price of Generic 
+ Switching Cost. A rational decision-maker would choose to have the generic form of a drug 
prescribed only if his or her assessment of quality far supersedes the total cost of the generic, 
which is comprised of the accounting cost of the drug and the switching  cost (Nayak, 2013). 
Given that generics are only available once patent protections for the innovator drug have 
expired, this switching cost  is the effort required of the physician to update their information 




(Nayak, 2013). Indeed, at the point of generic market entry, physicians are already familiar with 
the innovator drug’s quality profile.  Thus, the decision to instead prescribe a generic would 
involve effort, psychological and time-based switching costs whereby the physician evaluates the 
quality of the newer generic against the quality profile of the time-tested innovator drug.  
Empirically, this means that generic substitution practices (and associated switching costs) 
should change as physician awareness and knowledge regarding the generic’s quality profile 
increases. Consequently, switching costs contingent on a trade-off between novelty versus 
certainty should diminish over time until they are almost negligible. Succinctly stated, the total 
cost of the generic (i.e. Price of Generic + Switching Cost) diminishes but perception of quality 
increases as more is known about the generic, that is, as the generic builds its own brand equity.  
The cost-quality trade-off is altered during the lifecycle of the generic, becoming more favourable 
over time.  
The following is succinct equational portrayal of the preceding discussion.  
• A rational and perfect physician agent would choose the innovator drug where 
QB - QG > CB - CG + Cs 
• Where QB is the quality of the innovator drug; QG is the quality of the generic; CB is the cost 
of the innovator drug; CG is the cost of the generic; CS is the switching cost 
• Conversely, under perfect agency a rational physician would opt for the generic successor 







A physician’s prescription decision process is influenced by a complex range of person-
specific, socioeconomic and pharmacological considerations unique to the agency relationship 
and healthcare. Appreciably, modelling these determinants would involve capturing latent, 
interactive, and complex measures by substituting observable characteristics to glean insight into 
the drivers of brand preferences.  
The dynamics of the multisource drug markets including the impact of market exclusivity, 
perceived quality and moral hazard on physician prescription decisions have been investigated 
repeatedly. Concurrently, far-removed within the subject area of marketing there have been 
vigorous psychometric analyses of both Aaker’s and Keller’s domains of brand equity. What 
hitherto has yet to be achieved is the combination of these two distinct spheres of expertise. To 
this end, our analytical approach measures the competitive advantage an innovator incumbent 
has over subsequent bioequivalent generics owing to brand equity. Our estimation models 
explore the merits of brand equity for the innovator drug as it pertains to market monopoly 
protections and strategic entry deterrence (aim 1); switching behaviour versus habit 
persistence (aim 2); and favourable payment structures (aim 3). 
Our regression analysis builds upon the work of 5 authors namely, Hellerstein (1994 & 
1998), Howard (1997), Steinman (2007), Rice (2011), and Nayak (2013). Using NAMCS as a sample 
frame and similar estimation methods, each of these authors has found evidence consistent with 
brand equity in multisource prescription decisions including: “habit persistence, “switching 
costs”, “brand preferences” and “economic branding”.  Yet to date, none of the vanguards within 
this niche of the literature have incorporated brand equity theory to explicate results or to inform 




been consistent though unexplained findings about a provider’s pharmaceutical brand 
preferences, by utilising brand equity theory. 
To reiterate, the basic sampling unit for NAMCS is the physician-patient encounter or 
office visit. It is likely that prescriptions written by the same physician are correlated.  This line of 
reasoning is further bolstered by repeated evidence of habit persistence among individual 
physicians. For example, Howard (1997) found that specific antimicrobial drugs e.g. 
sulfamethoxazole-trimethoprim, are always prescribed by physicians as either Bactrim or Septra 
(brand-name forms), while amoxicillin is mostly prescribed as the generic. Therefore, in keeping 
with the precedent set forth by Hellerstein (1994), we estimate our model using a logit 
specification with clustering of prescriptions written by the same physician. By controlling for the 
physician cluster effect, each physician cluster forms the unit of observation in lieu of using each 
patient encounter as the unit of observation (Rice, 2011).  Notably, Rice (2011) found that 
standard errors based on the physician clusters minimise the effect of multiple observations per 
physician. In comparison to non-clustered robust standard errors, the clustered standard errors 
tended to be larger, reducing the statistical significance of most covariates (Rice, 2011). 
To test our hypotheses, we propose a series of logistic regression models that align with 
study objectives. Each of the logistic regression models separately tests a different group of 
independent variables in relation to our outcome variable. These independent variable sets 
pertain to pioneer/ first-mover advantage characteristics, information diffusion characteristics, 
and Insurance coverage characteristics. Our primary outcome measure is a binary variable which 
describes the likelihood of a physician prescribing an innovator (brand-name) drug. This binary 
prescription decision variable is assigned as: 1- Physician prescribes the innovator version of a 




advantage and information diffusion are inherent to the process of creating brand equity (Aaker, 
1992). Moral hazard is introduced to the equation as a mitigating factor through the insurance 
coverage variable. The same set of covariates are included in each model and are purposed to 
control for practice, physician, patient and drug characteristics. Though we will separately model 
the relationship between our regressors and our outcome prescription decision variable, the 
basic model for this analysis can be expressed as: 
E(Y|x) = F(β0 + β1X1 + … + βkXk) 
Where: 
 Y = likelihood of Prescribing an Innovator drug (1) or a Generic Drug; 
 X1 - Xk = observed independent variables; 
 β0 - βk = estimated model coefficients; and 
 F(.) = the logistic function. 
Estimation Equation  
The estimation equation surmises the decision on whether to prescribe the innovator version of a drug, 




)  = β0 + βz Z  + βD Dd + βPPj + βx Xi + βI Ii + εijd 
Where:  
Z = A vector of brand equity characteristics including length of monopoly, length of generic drug 
availability, information differential, and price premium 
Dd= A vector of drug dummies and prescription characteristics 
P= A vector of physician and practice characteristics 




Ii = A vector of patient’s insurance coverage or expected payment source 
Of note, I do not consider medical condition as part of the patient’s relevant personal 
characteristics. Indeed, while the patient’s condition affects the type of drug prescribed, it is unlikely to 
dominate the decision to prescribe innovator version of a drug versus the generic.  Referencing 
Hellerstein, 1998, the condition of the patient can be construed to be an unobserved characteristic of the 
patient that remains in the residual. 
Based on the results of the logistic regression models aligned with each of the 3 aims, a composite 
prescription decision model will be constructed. This final model blends all 3 groups of independent 
variables – brand equity, information diffusion, and moral hazard variables – adjusting the regression 
based on fit, collinearity, specification, significance of predictors, and parsimony. Parameter level tests of 
significance will use the z-statistic based on each parameter’s robust standard error.  Overall model 
significance will be assessed using a Wald test. 
 
POWER ANALYSIS 
Anticipating a small effect size, Power analysis for a logistic regression was conducted using the guidelines 
established in Lipsey & Wilson, (2001) and G*Power 3.1.7 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2013) to 
determine a sufficient sample size using an alpha of  0.05, a power of 0.80, a small  effect size (odd ratio 




Table 2: Data Analysis Matrix 





AIM 1:  To verify the 
presence of an 
innovator first-mover 
(or pioneer) advantage 
and quantify its impact 
on physician preferences 
in a multisource drug 
market 
 Longer periods of 
innovator market 
exclusivity bestow a 
first-mover (pioneering) 
competitive advantage 
to the innovator drug 










• Innovator Price 
Premium 
• Innovator Monopoly 
Period 
• Generic Availability 
Period 
 
Monopoly protections granted by patents favour the 
innovator drug long after the removal of competitive 
barriers (a pioneering advantage).  
 
If innovator drugs have a competitive advantage, we 
expect: 
1. Longer innovator monopoly periods associated with 
greater likelihood of prescribing the innovator drug 
2. Longer innovator monopoly periods strongly 
correlated with sustained innovator price premiums 
in a multisource drug market 
3. Generic Availability period may attenuate the effect 
size of Price premiums and Monopoly periods 
 
 
AIM 2: To delineate the 
process generic drug 
acceptance among 
physicians 
 Physicians will initially 
overestimate the quality 
differential between an 
innovator drug and a 
generic entrant 
 
The quality differential 
between an innovator 
and its bioequivalent 












• Innovator Price 
premium 
 
Newer generics need time to establish their therapeutic 
credentials (i.e. build their own brand equity) relative to 
those of the innovator. Therefore, physicians will initially 
overestimate quality differentials between innovator 
drugs and newer generics but arrive at the true (smaller) 
quality differential with time and experience. 
 
If there is evidence of time-dependent information 
diffusion for generic drugs, we expect:  
1. New generics have large consensus quality 
differentials; older generics have small consensus 
quality differentials. 
2. The innovator price premium will diminish over time 









AIM 3: To examine the 
role of insurance 
coverage in qualifying 
physician brand loyalty 









• Insurance Type 
• Innovator Price 
Premium 




• Innovator Monopoly 
Period 
• Generic Availability 
Period 
Moral hazard and other restrictions (e.g. formulary 
allowances, co-pay) associated with third party payers 
will change the magnitude of effect associated with 
brand equity.  
 
If there is evidence of moral hazard, we expect:  
1. An increased likelihood of prescribing an innovator 
drug for patients with private insurance particularly 
where a significant price differential exists 
2. A decreased likelihood of prescribing an innovator 
drug for patients without insurance coverage 
3. Adding insurance variables will decrease the effect 
sizes associated with price premiums, market exclusivity, 
and consensus quality differentials on prescribing 
preferences 
COVARIATES FOR ALL 
MODELS 
• Physician characteristics 
• Practice Characteristics 
• Patient Characteristics  









  Following the inclusion and exclusion criteria specified in our study design we selected 
the top 6 multisource drugs in the sample based on first drug mentions. The specified drug 
sample is depicted in Appendix A. The breakdown of innovator / generic binary decisions by 
physicians in our sample are depicted in Table 3.   There are 143,081 prescriptions or drug 
mentions in the combined 2015 and 2016 data set. Of these, our drug sample comprises 7.4% 
of all prescriptions (10648 drug mentions). Notably there is a high generic substitution rate of 
72%, a marked increase when compared to analysis of the generic prescription rate in 
previous years. For example, Hellerstein (1998) looked at the 1989 NAMCS and noticed only 
about a 30% generic substitution rate.   
As specified in the proposed study design, the unit of analysis is the physician-patient 
encounter. The larger data set includes 41,497 total patient visits of which 98% are with a 
physician.  A prescription is dispensed in 72% of these physician-patient encounters (Table 5).  
Overall, there are 8072 Physicians in the data set though only 12.5% write a prescription 
involving any of the 6 drugs in our sample (Figure 4). 
Furthermore, most patients in the sample are over the age of 45 (91%), have seen the 
physician before (85%) and have at least one chronic condition (90%). Regarding expected 
source of payment, 36% of patients in the sample have private insurance coverage and 47% 
have Medicare.  Other insurance categories are relatively uncommon (Table 4). 
95% of physician prescribers included in the analysis are Doctors of Medicine, while 5% 




equally between primary, medical and surgical specialties. 74% of prescriptions are 
prescribed by physicians operating in individual or physician group practices.  Additionally, 
42% of prescriptions in the sample are prescribed by physicians operating in the Midwest 
(Table 5).  





AMLODIPINE ATORVASTATIN AMOXICILLIN LISINOPRIL LEVOTHYROXINE ALPRAZOLAM  TOTAL 
No. GENERIC 
PRESCRIPTIONS 







































Table 4: Prescription Choice by Patient Characteristics 
PATIENT 
CHARACTERISTICS 
VERSION OF DRUG PRESCRIBED 
No.  OF GENERIC 
PRESCRIPTIONS 





























































































VERSION OF DRUG PRESCRIBED 
No.  OF GENERIC 
PRESCRIPTIONS 
 No. OF INNOVATOR 
PRESCRIPTIONS 
 
















Total number of drug mentions 10,648 
Generic prescription rate 72% 
Innovator prescription rate 28% 
 
Figure 4: Summary of Physician-Patient Encounters 
 
 
UNIT OF ANALYSIS – Physician – Patient Encounter
• 8072 Physicians in the data set (~ 12.5% included in the analysis )
• Participants in NAMCS are asked to provide data on approximately 30 
patient visits during a randomly-assigned, 1-week reporting period.
• 95% MD  and 5% DO
PHYSICIANS
• 41,497 total patient visits
• 40,847 of these patient visits are with a physician
• 29,680  total patient encounters involve a prescription
PATIENT VISITS
• 143,081  prescriptions (or drug mentions)





Table 5: Prescription Choice by Physician and Practice Characteristics 
PHYSICIAN AND PRACTICE 
CHARACTERISTICS 
VERSION OF DRUG PRESCRIBED 
No. OF GENERIC 
PRESCRIPTIONS 
No. OF INNOVATOR 
PRESCRIPTIONS 
SPECIALTY 


















































Total number of drug 
mentions 
10,648 
Generic prescription rate 72% 












Table 6: Average Marginal Effects of Logistic Regression 








BRAND EQUITY PRIMARY PREDICTORS 
INNOVATOR MONOPOLY 
DURATION 
  0.0141 *** 0.002 _______ _______   0.0094 *** 0.001 
YEARS OF GENERIC 
AVAILABILITY 
_______ _______ _______ _______ - 0.0022 *** 0.001 
GENERIC AVAILABILITY 
RATIO 
_______ _______ - 0.1467 *** 0.014 _______ _______ 
PRICE PREMIUM - 0.3480 *** 0.012 - 0.3876 ***  0.009 - 0.3222 *** 0.015 
PRESCRIPTION CHARACTERISTICS 
NUMBER OF MEDICATIONS   0.0009 0.001   0.0002 0.001 - 0.0001 0.001 
CONTINUED MEDICATION   0.0001 0.012   0.0233 ** 0.010 - 0.0006 0.009 
NO USE OF ELECTRONIC 
PRESCRIBING 
  0.0279 * 0.015   0.0275 * 0.014   0.0233 * 0.012 
DRUG DUMMYS 
LISINOPRIL - 0.0246 *** 0.008 - 0.0408 *** 0.009 - 0.0169 *** 0.008 
AMLODIPINE   0.0273 *** 0.005   0.0435 *** 0.006   0.0154 *** 0.005 
LEVOTHYROXINE - 0.0500 *** 0.009   0.0329 *** 0.005 - 0.0259 *** 0.009 
ALPRAZOLAM   0.0829 *** 0.011   0.1256 *** 0.013   0.0829 *** 0.011 
ATORVASTATIN  - 0.0003 0.0062 - 0.0734 *** 0.011 - 0.0003 ** 0.0062 
PHYSICIAN VARIABLES  
SURGICAL CARE SPECIALTY   0.0022 0.008   0.0128 0.008   0.0045 0.062 
MEDICAL CARE SPECIALTY   0.0019 0.008   0.0155 0.008   0.0042 0.061 
D.O – DOCTOR OF 
OSTEOPATHY 




HEALTH CENTER; HOSPITAL 
  0.0042 0.011   0.0064 0.011   0.0066 0.009 
OWNER= INSURANCE 
COMPANY, HEALTH PLAN, 
OR HMO 
  0.0139 * 0.011   0.0160* 0.012   0.0199 ** 0.010  
SOLO PRACTICE   0.0020 0.007   0.0049 0.007   0.0037 0.006 
MIDWEST  0.0116 * 0.008   0.0138* 0.009   0.0170 *** 0.007 
SOUTH  0.0034 0.009 - 0.0043 0.009   0.0036 0.007 












NON-MSA - 0.0012 0.011   0.0064 0.012 - 0.0026 0.008 
PATIENT DEMOGRAPHICS 
AGE   0.0001 0.001   0.0003 0.001   -0.0001 0.001 
MALE - 0.0072 0.004 - 0.0092  0.005 - 0.0072 0.004 
RACE =BLACK - 0.0056 0.008 - 0.0034 0.008 - 0.0054 0.006 
RACE = HISPANIC  0.0008 0.010   0.0081 0.010   0.0043 0.009 
RACE = OTHER - 0.0087 0.012 - 0.0087 0.013 - 0.0024 0.010 
NEW PATIENT   0.0020 0.006   0.0027 0.006   0.0004 0.005 
CHRONIC CONDITION - 0.0130  0.009 - 0.0080 0.008 - 0.0050 0.006 
PATIENT INSURANCE 
MEDICARE   0.0012 0.005 - 0.0034 0.005   0.0011 0.005 
MEDICAID   0.0034 0.012 - 0.0012 0.012   0.0034 0.013 
WORKER’S COMPENSATION - 0.0041 0.018   0.0039 0.023 - 0.0031 0.014 
SELF   0.015 0.014   0.0189 0.014   0.014 0.016 
OTHER   0.015 0.018   0.0111 0.018   0.015 0.018 
 
PSEUDO R2   0.6886     0.6696  0.6910  
LOG LIKELIHOOD -1730.8519  -1836.6456  -1828.2494  
OBSERVATIONS   9459    9459  1012  
NUMBER OF PHYSICIAN 
CLUSTERS 
1102  1102  1143  
PREDICTIONS CORRECTLY 
CLASSIFIED 
  97.90%  96.54%  97.85%  
Note 1:  ***, ** and * are significant at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively 
 
Note 2:  Standard Errors based on Physician clusters 
 
Note 3: Reference Variables – New medications, Use of electronic prescribing, Amoxicillin, Primary Care Specialty, 
M.D., Physician or Physician Group, Non-Solo Practice, Northeast, MSA, Female, White, Established Patient, No 







SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
To analyse the influence of brand equity on physician’s decision to prescribe a generic 
or innovator drug, a logit model that considers the effect of physician clustering is estimated. 
By controlling for the physician clustering effect, each physician cluster is used as the unit of 
observation instead of treating each individual patient office visit as the unit of observation 
(Pepper, 2002; Wooldridge 2003; Rice, 2011). The estimated standard errors are then robust 
and provide unbiased statistical inferences. The estimates are presented in Table 6.  Our 
analysis incorporates several indicators of brand equity: 1)brand equity defined as the price 
premium between an innovator drug and its generic successor; 2) brand equity is evidenced 
by brand loyalty and habit persistence, that is, the increased likelihood of prescribing an 
innovator drug in a multisource drug market; and  3) Brand equity is quantified as the 
perceived consensus quality differential between an innovator drug and generic substitutes. 
BRAND EQUITY PREDICTORS 
Innovator Monopoly duration 
In the first model, the coefficient for innovator monopoly duration is positive and 
significant, which confirms our stated hypotheses : The longer an innovator has a monopoly 
in the market, the more likely it is that the innovator will be prescribed over its generic 
successors in subsequent multisource markets. In the first model, each year of prior innovator 
monopoly is associated with a 1.4% greater likelihood that physicians in the sample prescribe 
the innovator over other generic substitutes.  Accordingly, we corroborate our first 
hypothesis that an innovator drug with a long period of market exclusivity has a first-mover 
advantage in subsequent multisource markets.   The positive and significant coefficient for 




which to cultivate brand equity and form a loyal customer base.  The result of brand loyalty is 
that physicians in a multisource market are more likely to opt for the established innovator 
over newer bioequivalent generic substitutes. 
Generic Availability 
Notably, the first model does not account for the length of generic availability. Indeed, 
when the duration of generic availability is accounted for in model 3, the average marginal 
effect of innovator monopoly diminishes though remains statistically significant - each year 
of prior innovator monopoly is associated with a 0.94% greater likelihood of prescribing the 
innovator version of the drug. 
Indeed, a generic availability ratio with a significantly negative coefficient in model 2 
conforms with expectations – the longer a generic is available on the market the more likely 
it is to be prescribed in generic form as the length of market availability increases. In our 
sample, physicians are 15% less likely to prescribe the innovator the longer the length of 
generic availability increases. In model 3, it is notable that a single year of generic availability 
is associated with a small (0.2%) but significant decrease in the likelihood of prescribing a drug 
in its innovator form. 
The generic availability ratio pits the duration of generic availability against the 
duration of innovator availability (pre- and post-patent) in the market. Accordingly, this 
availability ratio is a proxy that can intuitively be understood as the consensus among 
physicians as to the quality difference between an innovator and its generic successors. We 
hypothesised that the medical community is risk-averse with a new and untested generic and 
will significantly overestimate the difference in quality between the novel generic and the 




perceptions are revised and the perceived difference in quality between the innovator 
incumbent and generic substitute diminishes. This hypothesis is confirmed by a significantly 
negative marginal effect for the generic availability ratio. This signifies that the longer a 
generic is available on the market relative to the innovator incumbent’s time on the market, 
the more likely the generic will be prescribed over the innovator. 
Price Premium 
The price premium variable is measured as the natural log of the ratio of innovator 
price to generic price. In all three models, the coefficient of the logistic regression is negative 
and significant. Estimations of average marginal effect suggest that physicians in our sample 
are between 32 to 38 percent less likely to prescribe a drug in its innovator form as the relative 
price of the innovator increases. 
Previous studies often exclude drug prices from the empirical analysis because of the 
assumption that physicians do not account for cost effectiveness in their prescription decision 
and are, furthermore, unaware of actual drug prices (Temin, 1980).  By including the price 
premium ratio in our models, we assert that while physicians may be unaware of exact price 
points, they do acknowledge relative differences in price especially when the differences 
between alternatives are large. The negative and very significant regressors for the price 
premium variable in the three models suggests that physicians are price sensitive. As the 
innovator-generic price differential increases, physicians are less likely to prescribe the 
innovator over its less expensive generic substitutes.  
While this result validates the notion of a price sensitive physician it does however 
reveal the limits of brand equity in our sample of physicians. One tenet of brand equity is that 




price difference signifies a perceived difference in quality between the brand and its 
substitutes.  As a financial construct, brand equity is represented by the price premium 
patients are willing to pay for an innovator drug over and above that of the bioequivalent 
generic.  Yet as agents to the principal patient, physicians in our sample are unwilling to 
accommodate the price premium associated with the innovator. Instead they opt for the 
cheaper generic. While physicians in our sample are loyal to an innovator drug with a long 
monopoly, this brand loyalty does not extend to a willingness to accommodate a price 
premium. 
PRESCRIPTION AND DRUG CHARACTERISTICS 
Prescription Characteristics 
The estimated effect of a patient being prescribed more than one medication is small 
and insignificant. This variable is included in the model to reduce correlation across 
prescriptions written for the same patient. Based on this result, dropping the variable from 
the model would barely affect the other estimates and it is doubtful that an estimator that 
accounts for clustering of prescription by patients is needed. 
A significant finding in all three models is the impact of electronic prescribing. It is 
notable that physicians who do not use electronic prescribing are more likely to prescribe the 
innovator version of a drug than those who do use electronic prescribing and that this 
difference is significant. Moreover, the variable for electronic prescribing is highly correlated 
to a separate variable determining the use of computerised systems to perform drug 
formulary checks. However, preliminary regression including both variables resulted in one 
of these variables being dropped from the model due to near perfect multicollinearity. This 




a tendency or at least the capability to perform drug formulary checks, which may explain 
their inclination to consider more cost-effective generic options. 
Drug Dummies 
The coefficients estimated for drug dummies in all 3 logistic regressions are 
remarkably large and highly statistically significant. There is considerable variation in 
innovator prescribing across individual drugs. Perceptibly, individual drug dummies account 
for a considerable share of the models’ explanatory power and when these regressors are 
dropped from the model, the probability of specification error is increased. Drug 
characteristics strongly influence the decision to prescribe either the innovator incumbent or 
generic substitute. Observed drug characteristics are the same for all physicians in the sample, 
so any degree of variation in innovator prescribing rates across drugs is an indication that 
physicians perceive drug attribute differently. 
The significant explanatory power of drug dummy variables in all three models 
supports the notion that physician behaviour is largely explained by habit persistence as 
argued in previous literature including Hellerstein (1998), Howard (1997) and Nayak (2013). 
Physicians in our sample tend to prescribe the same form (generic or innovator) of a drug to 
every patient regardless of patient characteristics.  
PHYSICIAN AND PRACTICE VARIABLES 
In all three models, while specialty and training bear no influence on the binary 
prescription decision, certain practice characteristics do influence which version of a drug is 
prescribed. Physicians practicing in the Mid-West are at a 10% level of statistical significance 




physicians practicing in the North East. Physicians in the West are consistently less likely to 
prescribe innovator drugs than the reference group of physicians practicing in the North East, 
though the difference is not statistically significant.  Contrary to stated expectations, 
physicians working at practices owned by an insurance company, health plan, or HMO are 
between 14% and 19% more likely to prescribe the innovator version of a drug than physicians 
working in individual or physician group practices. 
As is the case with the generic availability ratio, these findings further bolster our 
second hypothesis of their being a process of information diffusion and consensus building 
among physicians about a drug’s quality.  The implication is that physicians with 
characteristics in common share information about the efficacy of individual drugs and that a 
consensus is formed within groups of associating physicians (be it by region or practice) 
regarding the efficacy of innovator incumbent versus its generic successors. 
PATIENT DEMOGRAPHICS 
In all models, the coefficients of patient demographic variables are small and not 
statistically significant.  Though not statistically significant, the direction of regressors 
suggests that patients with chronic conditions may be less likely to receive the innovator 
compared to patients with no chronic conditions. Also, new patients may be more likely to 
receive innovator drugs than established patients. Previous literature (Nayak, 2013) have 
found these two variables to be statistically significant. Notwithstanding, patient 
demographics and traits do not appear to influence the prescription decision. 
Nonetheless, small non-significant patient demographic regressors in conjunction 
with the highly statistically significant drug dummy variables hints again at habit persistence.  




decisions. Instead, physicians in our sample are making the choice between an innovator or 
generic substitute based on ingrained pharmacological judgements rather than varying 
prescriptions according to patient characteristics. Thus, every patient in the physician’s 
cluster is prescribed the same form (generic or innovator) of a drug regardless of individual 
differences.  
PATIENT INSURANCE 
Using ordinary least squares, the regressor for no charge/ charity patients is negative, 
large, and significant. This implies that patients in this no charge category are significantly less 
likely than patients with private insurance to receive an innovator drug. However, as the 
no/charity parameter perfectly predicts failure (that is, all patients in this category receive a 
generic drug), it is dropped from the estimation of the logistic regression.   
The remaining regressors for insurance variables are not statistically significant and 
are small relative to their standard errors.  We conducted a Wald test to evaluate the 
difference between nested models to determine if insurance parameters were 
simultaneously equal to zero. The squared value generated by the Wald test was 1.39 with 
five degrees of freedom. Based on the p-value of 0.9253 we fail to reject the null hypothesis, 
indicating that insurance coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. Including insurance 
variables does not improve the fit of the model. Thus, in the interests of parsimony we would 
be justified in dropping insurance coefficients all together. However, in the literature there is 
compelling evidence that patient insurance status significantly impacts prescription decisions. 
This is in part supported by the excluded variable of no charge/charity patients, which 




Therefore, as this is a hypothesis driven model, we have chosen to keep insurance variables 























THE CONCEPTUAL THEORY 
In this dissertation, we propose that the most salient factor influencing physician 
behaviour is brand equity, which is both a monetary and qualitative construct. As a financial 
construct, brand equity is represented by the price premium patients are willing to pay for an 
innovator drug over and above that of the bioequivalent generic.  As a qualitative construct, 
brand equity represents a gradation of superlative, yet subjective characteristics possessed 
by the innovator drug versus its generic substitutes. Consistent with the marketing literature 
(Aaker, 1996; Keller, 1993; Keller 2001), these psychological attributes include greater 
awareness and knowledge of the innovator drug, positive associations with the innovator 
brand, and perceived quality of the innovator drug (often viewed as superior to the 
bioequivalent generic substitute). The result of this continuum of attitudinal change is 
entrenched brand loyalty to the innovator and habit persistence, a psychological attribute 
that can be quantitatively assessed by calculating the likelihood of prescribing the innovator 
drug over its generic successor.  
Given these monetary and qualitative descriptors,  our analysis incorporated several 
indicators of brand equity: 1)brand equity defined as the price premium between an innovator 
drug and its generic successor; 2) brand equity quantified by the increased likelihood of 
prescribing an innovator drug in a multisource drug market; and  3) Brand equity  quantified 






THE STUDY OBJECTIVES 
The overarching goal of this dissertation was to ascertain whether brand equity 
influences prescriber preferences between innovator (brand) drugs and generic alternatives 
and if third party payers can override such preferences. As such, our first aim was to establish 
whether innovator drugs have a first-mover advantage over generic successors in multisource 
markets.  Conversely, our second aim was to determine whether upon the removal of barriers 
to entry, generics can catch up with the pioneering advantages of the innovator. By so doing, 
our objective was to delineate the process of generic drug acceptance (including learning and 
switching behaviour) among physician prescribers. The final aim was to examine the role of 
insurance status in qualifying physician brand loyalty.  
EXPECTED FINDINGS VS MODEL RESULTS 
In keeping with the first aim, we hypothesised that longer periods of innovator market 
exclusivity bestow a first-mover competitive advantage to the innovator drug in subsequent 
multisource markets. We expected that longer periods of innovator market exclusivity are 
associated with a greater likelihood of innovator prescriptions once the market is open to 
competition from generics. Additionally, we predicted that the first mover advantage results 
in a greater likelihood of prescription despite their being a sustained price difference between 
the innovator and its generic substitutes. The results of the analysis partially corroborate the 
first hypothesis. Indeed, an innovator drug with a long period of market exclusivity has the 
first-mover advantage of brand loyalty in subsequent multisource markets.  A long period of 
market exclusivity is associated with a greater likelihood of prescribing a drug in its innovator 
form. However, while physicians are price sensitive, they are less likely rather than more likely 




The second hypothesis states that physicians will initially overestimate the perceived 
relative therapeutic benefit between an innovator drug and a generic entrant. This consensus 
quality differential between an innovator and its bioequivalent generic we expected to 
diminish over time as physicians familiarised themselves with the generic. The results fully 
support this second hypothesis. The longer a generic is available on the market relative to the 
innovator incumbent’s time on the market, the more likely the generic will be prescribed over 
the innovator. Accordingly, the results delineate a process of time-dependent information 
diffusion and generic drug acceptance. The length of generic availability facilitates prescriber 
learning and switching behaviour from innovator to generic.  Our results also intimate a 
process of consensus building among associating physicians within the same region or 
practice type.  
Finally, the third hypothesis asserts that insurance status will override the brand 
equity preferences of physicians. As innovator drugs tend to be more expensive than ensuing 
generics, we hypothesised that patients in my reference category of uninsured or self-pay 
patients will be least likely to receive branded innovator drugs, which is evidence of moral 
hazard (Lundin, 2000; Nayak, 2013).  Consistent with the literature, we also expected fewer 
innovator drug prescriptions to be dispensed to patients enrolled in public health insurance 
schemes such as Medicaid and Medicare (Rice, 2011), and cost containment payer systems 
such as Health Maintenance Organisations (HMOs) (Nayak, 2013; Thier, 2011).  However, our 
analysis does not affirm this hypothesis. On the contrary, insurance variables individually and 
jointly have no impact on the prescription decision between generic and innovator 
alternatives. While physicians are price sensitive, there is no evidence that physicians are 





Substantiating the existence of prescriber-based brand equity explains why health 
care payers and consumers alike are failing to realise the cost savings of a competitive off-
patent drug market despite bioequivalency data, favourable generic substitution policies, and 
pressure from payers to minimise cost.  Various elements of our proposed analysis intimate 
possible remedies. Given that extended innovator monopoly is found to significantly favour 
prescribing of the innovator over ensuing generics, it behoves policy makers to reconsider 
brand patent extensions as a means of strategic entry deterrence with far-reaching 
consequence. That extended innovator market exclusivity becomes a first-mover advantage 
evident in prescriber loyalty in subsequent multisource drug markets infers that innovating 
firms are incentivised to protect and capitalise on this head start.  
Conversely, it is evident that new generic competitors face the prospect of overcoming 
physicians’ knowledge gap and developing trust as physicians trial the new generic 
alternatives.  By building their own equity, new generic entrants bridge prescribers’ perceived 
quality differentiation between the innovator incumbent and novel generic options. If indeed 
innovator drugs have a head start on subsequent generics, it stands to reason that generics 
could eventually bridge this gap. Time confers generic substitutes the opportunity to build 
their own “equity”, as physicians familiarise themselves with the drug. As per Aaker’s model 
– product awareness and perceived quality are essential contributors to brand equity(Aaker, 
1991). Accordingly, physicians will more readily switch to older generics but remain loyal to 
the innovator drug (i.e. habit persistence) in the case of newer generics. This process of time-




Other notable findings include the tendency of physicians to prescribe the same 
version of a drug to all patients regardless of their demographics or medical profile. 
Hellerstein (1998), labels this inclination among prescribers as “habit persistence”. Yet the 
implementation of certain nudges may discourage habitual prescribing and instead 
encourage switching behaviour towards more cost-effective generic alternatives. One 
strategy implied by the results is the universal implementation of electronic prescribing using 
default options to increase generic medication prescribing rates. The efficacy of this 
behavioural nudge is borne out by the literature : In a pilot study (Patel et al, 2014)  of internal 
medicine practices at Penn Medicine, researchers found that changes to medical display 
defaults in the electronic health record resulted in higher rates of generic prescribing. After 
reviewing these findings, default settings were further refined and then launched throughout 
all practices among all specialties at Penn Medicine.  Before the intervention, the generic 
prescribing rate at Penn Medicine was steadily hovering around 75%. Immediately after the 














The goal of this dissertation is to understand the influence of brand equity on the 
physician prescriber decision-making process.  We determine that brand equity is critically 
important for physician prescribers to make points of differentiation between innovator 
branded drugs and their generic alternatives. We establish that time is a critical factor in 
cultivating brand equity thereby influencing prescriber choice. For innovator drugs, we find 
that extended periods of market exclusivity result in an increased likelihood of prescribing the 
innovator once the market is open to competition from generics. Conversely, we also 
determine the likelihood of switching to the generic in multisource drug markets. In weighing 
physician loyalty to the innovator (habit persistence) against the physician’s propensity to 
switch to the generic (switching behaviour), we examine how consensus perceived quality 
estimations between innovator and generic are revised over time and how such 
differentiation is reflected in prescriber habits. Finally, we determine that while the physician 
is price sensitive, they do not vary their prescription decision based on insurance status. 
LIMITATIONS 
Of note, our sample frame – The National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS) 
– is limited to non-federally employed office-based physicians who are primarily engaged in 
direct patient care.  Accordingly, results of our analysis have limited generalisability to 
inpatient care settings. Furthermore, the pooled cross-sectional design of the NAMCS survey 
hinders the possibility of examining individual preferences over time. To fully portray the 
impact of brand equity and moral hazard on prescriber practice, one would ideally like to 




longitudinal data would better render a more accurate estimation of switching behaviour and 
habit persistence. 
 Moreover, the analysis hinges on drug mentions. It is important to reiterate that 
medications ordered by the physician are not necessarily the medications ultimately 
dispensed to the patient by the pharmacist.  Barring physician injunction, the pharmacist has 
leeway to substitute an innovator for a generic or vice versa.  Generally, because of pricing 
considerations and formulary restrictions, dispensing rates of generic drugs are higher than 
prescribing rates (Nayak, 2013). The effect of such discretionary changeover is to de-link the 
physician’s prescription decision from what is dispensed. Without a data set that links the 
prescribing habits of physicians to pharmacist substitutions, it is difficult to extrapolate and 
quantify the influence that prescription habits exert on healthcare costs (Nayak, 2013).  
Nevertheless, as our research question focuses on the physician prescription order 
rather than the execution of it, discrepancies between prescriber choice and end-user 
practice do not impact the validity or accuracy of our conclusions. Relevance is still maintained 
because despite generic substitution policy, innovator dominance in the marketplace -both 
in pricing and volume- remains a current and intractable issue for policy makers and insurers 
alike. Hence an empirical analysis of prescriber habits and brand preferences would better 
elucidate the origins of this paradox.  
Finally, our analysis includes no controls for advertising and marketing efforts, which 
could potentially influence prescriber choice.  Therefore, we cannot assess how the 
promotion of the innovator brand or generic alternative bridges the physician knowledge gap 
or impacts perceived therapeutic equivalence.  Appreciably, a well strategised marketing 




any potential first mover advantage of the incumbent.  As an accurate measure of effort is 
difficult to construe, we have instead chosen to substitute effort with time. We include time 
variables such as the innovator monopoly period and the generic availability ratio asserting 
that, ceteris paribus, brand equity is a function of market presence. 
AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Many authors have studied the binary prescription decision between an innovator 
drug and a generic substitute.  They separately examined the impact of monopoly, price, and 
insurance status on prescriber behaviour. Indeed, some such as Hellerstein (1998) noted 
elements of habit persistence and brand loyalty among physician prescribers. Yet these 
observations, though repeated in the literature, were curious but incidental findings in the 
larger exploration of pharmaceutical demand.  
My contribution to the literature is to streamline these overlooked behavioural 
eccentricities by appropriating the concept of brand equity from marketing theory and 
applying it to the novel context of prescriber choice. Future research could delve into other 
aspects of brand equity, such as the influence of brand salience (name recognition and recall) 
and marketing, on prescriber choice. To better conceptualise prescriber learning and 
switching behaviours, prospective research could investigate the synergy between generic 
options. This could include an assessment of how switching behaviour alters based on generic 
order of entry and the number of generic competitors. Additionally, by varying and expanding 
the array of drug choices and therapeutic classes, one could better understand the extent to 
which a drug’s idiosyncrasies (such as narrow therapeutic index) promote either brand loyalty 
or switching behaviour. Moreover, in expanding the scope of drugs and number of physicians 




Finally, there is an exciting avenue of behavioural economic research, including the role of 
behavioural nudges (such as default generic prescriptions), Bayesian updating, and heuristics, 



























Appendix 1: Drug Sample 
CHEMICAL NAME OF 
DRUG 




Amlodipine  Norvasc* Cardiovascular agent 31 July 1992 
 Amlodipine 3 October 2005 
 
Atorvastatin  Lipitor* Metabolic agent 17 Dec 1996 
 Atorvastatin 30 November 2011 
 
Amoxicillin  Amoxil* Anti-infective 1 January 1982 
 Trimox 1 January 1982 
 Amoxicillin 1 January 1982 
 
Lisinopril Prinivil* Cardiovascular agent 29 December 1987 
 Zestril 19 May 1988 
 Lisinopril 1 July 2002 
 
Alprazolam Xanax * CNS Agent 1 January 1982 
 Alprazolam 19 October 2003 
 Xanax XR* 17 January 2003 




Synthroid Hormones 1 January 1982 
 Unithroid 21 August 2000 
 Levoxyl 25 May 2001 
 Levothyroxine Sodium 5 June 2002 
 Levothroid (thyro-
tabs) 
24 October 2002 




Of note, the innovator designation is given to the first version of the drug to be marketed and 
generic designation to all bioequivalent successors be they branded or otherwise.  Per this 
classification, the innovator drug is usually but not always the Reference Listed Drug (RLD)3. 
Additionally, marketing dates for drugs approved prior to 1982 are top coded at 1 January 1982 as per 
the FDA orange book convention. 
 
3 A Reference Listed Drug (RLD) is an approved drug product to which new generic versions are compared to 
show that they are bioequivalent. A drug company seeking approval to market a generic equivalent must refer 
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